Federalism in the Indian Constitution

Abstract

This assignment examines the multifaceted challenges confronting Indian federalism, a unique quasi-federal structure shaped by India’s vast cultural, linguistic, and regional diversity. While the Indian Constitution provides a federal framework, practical difficulties arise from regionalism, uneven division of powers, fiscal imbalances, politicization of constitutional offices, and pressures from external security threats. Understanding these challenges is critical to fostering cooperative federalism and ensuring political stability, democratic governance, and national unity in India.

Introduction

Federalism is a system of governance where powers and responsibilities are constitutionally divided between a central government and constituent political units. The Indian federal model is distinctive as it blends federal and unitary features to address the country’s complex pluralism and geographical expanse. Unlike federations like the USA or Australia, India’s federalism is often termed “quasi-federal” due to the strong role played by the center, especially during emergencies and constitutional amendments. Since independence, Indian federalism has faced persistent challenges from demands for regional autonomy, fiscalcentralization, political interference, diverse linguistic and cultural identities, and security concerns. These challenges test the resilience and adaptability of India’s federal architecture.

Challenges Faced by Indian Federalism

Indian federalism is unique in its nature, combining federal and unitary features under a constitutional framework that aims to accommodate the country’s vast diversity of languages, cultures, religions, and social practices. The Constitution of India establishes a dual polity, dividing powers between the Union and the States through the Seventh Schedule, which includes the Union List, State List, and Concurrent List. This division, however, involves a strong centralizing tendency, granting more powers and residuary authority to the Union government compared to the States. The states do not have the right to secede from the Union, distinguishing Indian federalism from classical federations like the USA or Australia where federating units originated from sovereign states. Several challenges impact the balance of power, center-state relations, and the overall functioning of the federal system:

Regionalism

The vast socio-cultural diversity leads to strong regional identities, which sometimes manifest as demands for greater autonomy or the creation of new states. Examples include the demands for Gorkhaland in West Bengal and Bodoland in Assam, and the controversial bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh to form Telangana in 2014 without the full consent of the parent state legislature.1 Regionalism poses a risk to national integration and political unity, exacerbating tensions between the center and states. Several states have witnessed conflicts fueled by regional pride or perceived neglect by the central government, making equitable development and political accommodation essential for federal stability.

Unequal Division and Distribution of Powers

The Indian Constitution provides for a federal structure by dividing legislative powers between the Union (central government) and the States through three distinct lists under the Seventh Schedule: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. This division aims to allocate jurisdiction over national and regional matters appropriately, allowing the Union government to legislate on subjects of national importance while states retain control over local matters. However, in practice, this constitutional arrangement exhibits a significant tilt in favor of the Union government, resulting in a predominance of central authority over the states. The Union List includes subjects such as defense, foreign affairs, and atomic energy, exclusively within the legislative competence of Parliament. The State List covers areas like public health, police, and agriculture, meant to be within state legislative control. The Concurrent List contains subjects such as education and marriage, where both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate; in cases of conflict, Union law prevails.Despite the clear division, the Constitution contains provisions allowing the Parliament to make laws on state subjects under specific situations that weaken state autonomy. For example, during a national emergency under Article 352, Parliament can legislate on any subject, including those on the State List. Similarly, under Article 249, if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution with a
two-thirds majority that it is necessary in the national interest, Parliament may legislate on a State List subject temporarily. Additionally, Article 252 allows Parliament to legislate for two or more states by their consent on a State List subject. The imposition of President’s Rule (Article 356) in a state further increases the central government’s control by suspending the state government and enabling direct governance from the center.These constitutional mechanisms collectively establish a marked predominance of the Union government in the legislative domain, often undermining the autonomy and sovereignty of the states. This over-centralization raises concerns about the limited scope for states to exercise independent
governance and decision-making, thereby posing challenges to the federal principle enshrined in the Constitution.

Absence of Robust Fiscal Federalism

Fiscal federalism in India is characterized by an imbalance where the central government retains predominant control over taxation powers and revenue distribution to states is largely
discretionary. This financial centralization makes many states dependent on the center for grants and tax devolution, creating concerns around transparency and adequacy of funds. The Finance Commission plays a key role in recommending revenue distribution, but its effectiveness is limited by political and data challenges. The implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) unified indirect taxes, but it significantly reduced states’ taxation autonomy and heightened concerns about compensation for revenue losses, impacting states’ fiscal independence.3 Fiscal Federalism Structure and Challenges in IndiaIndia’s fiscal federalism is constitutionally regulated through provisions like Articles 270 (tax distribution), 275 (grants-in-aid), and 280 (Finance Commission), while the Seventh Schedule defines
taxation powers between the center and states. Despite these provisions, the center controls most major taxation, including income tax and indirect taxes pre-GST, leaving states reliant on tax devolution and grants. State borrowing is also regulated by the center (Article 293), constraining fiscal autonomy.4 The Finance Commission recommends tax share and grants every five years, but states often face delays and inadequacies in funds, leading to fiscal dependency and constraints on state expenditure priorities . The Role of the Governor and President’s Rule The Governor, appointed by the President of India (the Union government), holds a constitutional position of paramount importance in the administration of each state. As the constitutional head of the state, the Governor is entrusted with various responsibilities, including summoning and proroguing the state legislature, giving assent to bills passed by the legislature, and ensuring the constitutional functioning of the state government. However, the office of the Governor has frequently become politicized, which has raised significant concerns about the impartiality and autonomy of this constitutional role.Unlike the judiciary or other independent constitutional authorities, the Governor is appointed by the central government, often on the advice of the Union Cabinet. This appointment process has led to allegations of partisan behavior, with Governors sometimes accused of favoring the ruling party at the Center rather than acting as neutral arbiters in state affairs. Such bias undermines the federal character of the Indian polity by compromising the Governor’s role as a guardian of the state’s constitutional machinery. A critical aspect where this politicization manifests is in the invocation of Article 356 of the Constitution, which allows the President to impose President’s Rule in a state if the Governor reports that the state government cannot function according to constitutional provisions. Over the years, there have been numerous instances where Article 356 has been misused by the central government to dismiss elected state governments for political gains. This misuse frequently occurs under pretexts such as breakdown of constitutional machinery or failure of law and order but is often viewed as a tool to weaken or destabilize opposition-ruled states.
The recurring use and alleged abuse of Article 356 has stirred widespread debate and criticism among scholars, judiciary, and political analysts, as it poses a serious threat to the autonomy of states and the federal principles enshrined in the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India, in landmark judgments like the S.R. Bommai case (1994), has sought to curb arbitrary use of Article 356 by laying down strict guidelines and emphasizing the need for federal balance and judicial review.6 Despite this, the political nature of gubernatorial appointments and the discretionary power of Governors continue to provoke concerns regarding the erosion of state sovereignty and the centralization of power.

Language and cultural conflicts

India is characterized by immense linguistic diversity, which is constitutionally acknowledged through the recognition of multiple official languages. The Constitution of India, under Article 344 and the Eighth Schedule, lists 22 scheduled languages, reflecting the multilingual nature of the country. This linguistic plurality is a source of rich cultural heritage but also poses challenges in managing language policy, particularly in the context of national integration and administrative efficiency. One of the most contentious issues has been the perceived imposition of Hindi as a national or official language. Although Hindi in the Devanagari script is designated as the official language of the Union under Article 343, the Constitution also mandates the continued use of English for official purposes alongside Hindi for an initial period of fifteen years from the commencement of the Constitution, which has since been extended indefinitely to accommodate linguistic diversity. Despite these provisions, attempts to promote Hindi as the sole or dominant language have met with significant resistance, especially from the non-Hindi-speaking southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh.The resistance stems from concerns about cultural identity, linguistic autonomy, and fear of marginalization of regional languages and cultures. This opposition has historically manifested in widespread protests and political movements, notably the anti-Hindi agitations in Tamil Nadu during the 1960s, which played a crucial role in shaping language policy in India towards greater accommodation of linguistic plurality.More recently, controversies have arisen around language provisions in the National Education Policy (NEP), which recommends the “three-language formula,” encouraging the learning of Hindi, English, and a regional language. Critics argue that such policies may again tilt disproportionately in favour of Hindi, stoking fears of renewed imposition and cultural conflict.7 Non-Hindi-speaking states continue to advocate for stronger protections and promotion of their regional languages, emphasizing that linguistic diversity should be respected rather than subordinated.Thus, while the Constitution aims to balance national cohesion with cultural and linguistic diversity, the politics of language remains a sensitive and complex issue in India, with ongoing conflicts reflecting deeper questions about identity, federalism, and cultural
respect.Indian Constitution, Article 344 and Eighth Schedule: Recognition of official languages.

Indian Constitution, Article 343: Official Language of the Union

Ministry of Education, Government of India, National Education Policy 2020: Language provisions and controversies.India’s linguistic diversity is constitutionally recognized through the Eighth Schedule, which lists 22 scheduled languages, reflecting the country’s rich multilingual fabric. The Constitution, under Article 343, designates Hindi in Devanagari script as the official language of the Union but also mandates the use of English for official purposes alongside Hindi for an indefinite period to accommodate diversity. Despite these safeguards, efforts to promote Hindi as a national or dominant official language have frequently led to conflicts, particularly with non-Hindi-speaking southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh. The southern states have historically perceived the imposition or promotion of Hindi as a threat to their linguistic and cultural identity, leading to significant opposition movements, including the anti-Hindi agitations of the 1960s, which played a pivotal role in shaping language policy in India towards greater pluralism. These movements underscored fears of cultural marginalization and asserted the importance of preserving regional languages. More recently, controversy has emerged regarding the National Education Policy’s (NEP) language provisions, which recommend a three-language formula involving Hindi, English, and a regional language. Critics from non-Hindi-speaking states argue that this policy again privileges Hindi, fueling apprehensions about linguistic imposition and renewed cultural conflicts. The ongoing debates highlight the sensitive nature of language politics in India and the challenge of balancing national integration with respect for linguistic plurality.

Indestructible Union and Destructible Units

The Indian Federation is distinctly characterized by the principle of an “Indestructible Union and Destructible Units,” which sets it apart from many other federal systems where constituent units possess a degree of sovereignty and a theoretical right to secede. The Constitution of India declares the Union of India as a single, indissoluble entity, explicitly denying states the right to secede. This constitutional framework ensures the permanence of the Indian Union, reinforcing national unity and integrity as paramount constitutional values. Unlike sovereign states in some federations, Indian states are recognized as units of the Union with limited sovereignty. Their existence and authority are constitutionally derived and can be altered by the central government. Under Article 3 of the Constitution, Parliament has the power to create new states, alter the boundaries of existing states, or even change their names without requiring the consent of the affected state legislatures. This provision has been used multiple times in Indian history to reorganize state boundaries to better reflect linguistic, cultural, or administrative considerations.A prominent example of this power is the creation of the state of Telangana in 2014.9 The state was carved out of Andhra Pradesh through an act of Parliament despite initial opposition from parts of the parent state’s legislature and public, reflecting the center’s authority to restructure states in the interest of administrative efficiency and regional aspirations. While this mechanism supports national cohesion and administrative responsiveness, it also raises concerns about the erosion of state autonomy and the degree of federal trust accorded to regional entities.Critics argue that this central power to alter state boundaries without full state consent weakens the federal balance by rendering states more vulnerable to central intervention. Such a system reflects the quasi-federal nature of Indian federalism, where the Union government wields significant power relative to the states, and
the federal principle is subordinated to the goal of national unity. While this arrangement helps manage India’s vast diversity and unity, it continuously sparks debates over the proper balance between central authority and state self-governance.

Conflict over Central Agencies and Investigation Powers

Central investigative agencies in India, particularly the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), frequently become focal points of conflict between the Union government and state governments. The CBI is a premier investigative agency under the administrative control of the central government, tasked with probing complex crimes, corruption, and other significant cases of national and inter-state importance. However, the federal nature of Indian governance creates a delicate balance in law enforcement authority between the center and the states, often leading to tensions.A key issue arises because the Constitution grants states primary responsibility over law and order within their territories, falling under the State List. For the CBI to investigate a crime within a state, the consent of the state government is generally required, except in cases authorized by the central government or the courts. This requirement reflects respect for state sovereignty and federal principles but has sometimes been used by state governments as political leverage.When the central government and the state government are ruled by different political parties, CBI investigations may be perceived as tools of political vendetta or central interference. As a result, states have at times withdrawn or refused to grant consent for CBI probes within their jurisdiction, thereby challenging the authority of the agency and complicating investigations. Such withdrawals underscore an ongoing struggle over control and autonomy in governance and law enforcement.This conflict points to a broader issue about the balance of power in Indian federalism, where central agencies exercise significant power but are dependent on state cooperation for jurisdictional effectiveness. The Supreme Court of India has attempted to regulate the functioning of the CBI to prevent misuse, including directives for fair investigation and restrictions on politically motivated cases. Nonetheless, the disputes over central investigation powers continue to reflect tensions inherent in India’s quasi-federal.

Legislative Conflicts and Cooperative Federalism

The Indian federal system entails a complex coexistence of Union and State legislative powers, which sometimes leads to conflicts, particularly on subjects listed in the Concurrent List. The Constitution of India delineates the legislative domains of the Union and the States, but overlapping jurisdictions—especially in areas like education, health, and environmental regulation—often create disputes. When both the Union and the States legislate on the same subject, conflicts can arise, especially if the laws are inconsistent with each other.In cases of conflict between Union and State law, the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy under Article 254 of the Constitution states that Union law prevails, and the State law becomes void to the extent of inconsistency. This legal primacy of the Union law underscores the tendency for the Union to assert its dominance in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, which can erode state autonomy and fuel regional tensions. Promoting cooperative federalism — a governance approach where both Union and State governments work collaboratively—has been recognized as a vital strategy to manage these conflicts. Cooperative federalism emphasizes dialogue, coordination, and mutual respect in
policy implementation, with the objective of fostering national unity while respecting regional diversities. However, achieving this ideal remains challenging, particularly in politically diverse governance environments where different political parties control the Union and various States. Challenges to cooperative federalism include inter-governmental distrust, divergent political agendas, and administrative conflicts. These difficulties often lead to confrontational approaches rather than collaboration, complicating policy execution and diluting the federal spirit. Nevertheless, strengthening mechanisms for dialogue, constitutional amendments to
better delineate jurisdiction, and judicial interventions aimed at resolving disputes are crucial steps toward fostering a more cooperative federal framework.

In sum, conflict-resolution and fostering a collaborative approach between Union and State legislatures are essential for maintaining the constitutional balance and ensuring effective governance in India’s diverse and pluralistic society.

Challenges from External and Security Pressures

The Constitution grants the central government special powers to act in matters affecting national security in border states and conflict zones. For instance, laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) empower the central government to deploy armed forces with special authority to maintain public order in disturbed areas. Similarly, the use of President’s Rule under Article 356 can be invoked in states facing severe internal disturbances that threaten governance or security.While such central interventions may be necessary to maintain national unity, they often lead to friction with local state governments and populations. Many regional leaders and communities perceive these actions as heavy-handed or intrusive, fueling resentment against the central government and deepening alienation. This is especially pronounced in states like Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, and Assam, where local identity and autonomy concerns intensify the conflict between central authority and regional aspirations.The resulting strains on federal relations complicate governance, as cooperation between the Union and the state becomes difficult amid mistrust and political disagreements. The balancing act between preserving national integrity and respecting the autonomy and sentiments of border states remains a delicate and ongoing challenge within the Indian federal framework.

Conclusion

Indian federalism is a complex, evolving system balancing unity and diversity. While constitutionally federal, it leans toward a strong center to safeguard national integrity amid diversity and security challenges. The key to its success lies in fostering cooperative and collaborative federalism by respecting state autonomy, ensuring fair fiscal federalism, minimizing politicization of constitutional offices, and managing regional aspirations inclusively. Strengthening institutional mechanisms like the Inter-State Council, Finance Commission, and NITI Aayog, along with judicial safeguarding of federal principles, can help address these challenges. A pragmatic and flexible approach to federalism that adapts to India’s unique socio-political landscape remains essential for the country’s unity and democratic governance. This assignment synthesizes key challenges from the provided materials and additional scholarly insights to present a nuanced understanding of the issues confronting Indian federalism

Endnotes

● Indian constitution
● Malik, M. Asad. “Changing Dimensions of Federalism in India: An Appraisal.” ILI Law Review, Vol. II, Winter Issue 2019.
● Rout, Sangram Keshari. “Indian Federalism: Issues and Challenges.” ClearIAS.
● “Complexity of Indian Federalism.” Drishti IAS Daily Updates, June 2023.
● Granville Austin, “The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation,” Oxford University Press, 1966.