Published on: 16th January 2025
Authored by: Charvi Batra
Amity University Gurugram
FACTS OF THE CASE
The case arose because of the reference made by the 5-judge Constitution bench in 1999 after the Gudalur Janmam Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 was struck down by the Supreme Court in Balmadies Plantation Ltd. & Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1972). However, this Act was added to the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by the Thirty-Fourth Amendment Act (1974). In a similar fashion, the Calcutta High Court observed Section 2(c) of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979 to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. Nevertheless, this Act was also inserted in the Ninth Schedule by the Sixty-Sixth Amendment. These amendments were the focal point of the case before the five-judge bench.
The constitutional bench referred to the preliminary Supreme Court judgment in the case of Waman Rao & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1981). It was held that laws included in the Ninth Schedule through amendments made after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati case judgment), could be challenged if any or some parts of the Act were violative of fundamental principles of the Constitution, such as Article 14, Article 19, Article 21 (aka Golden Triangle) and other related provisions. For that reason, the case was referred to the larger bench of nine judges to re-evaluate the Waman Rao case’s decision and establish the final position of the Supreme Court.
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE
The key questions before the Supreme Court were:
- Whether the Parliament can shield legislation from fundamental rights by using the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution after the doctrine of basic structure has been postulated?
- What would be the effect of such authority of the Parliament on the judicial review of the court?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Arguments put forth by petitioner (Dr. I.R. Coelho and others):
Violation of the Basic Structure Doctrine: The primary argument put forth by the petitioners was that some constitutional amendments, particularly those made under Article 368 (which allows Parliament to amend the Constitution), were violating the Basic Structure Doctrine. This doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), holds that Parliament can amend the Constitution but cannot alter its fundamental structure. The petitioners contended that certain amendments, which were made by the Parliament, had the potential to destroy the core values and principles upon which the Indian Constitution is based—such as democracy, rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary.
Judicial Review is Necessary: The petitioners argued that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution. Therefore, any amendment that alters the basic structure should be subject to judicial scrutiny. This was essential to prevent any amendment from undermining the Constitution’s fundamental principles. The petitioners wanted the Court to declare that no amendment made under Article 368 could violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution.
Protection of Fundamental Rights: The petitioners also argued that certain constitutional amendments sought to infringe upon the protection of fundamental rights and the autonomy of the judiciary. They feared that the Parliament, by making arbitrary amendments, could undermine the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, especially in the absence of any judicial review.
Arguments put forth by respondent (State of Tamil Nadu and Others):
Parliament’s Sovereignty in Amending the Constitution: The respondents (including the State of Tamil Nadu and other supporting parties) argued that the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was vested exclusively in Parliament. They contended that once an amendment was passed by Parliament, it was final, and judicial review over these amendments was not permissible. In their view, allowing the judiciary to review amendments would undermine the democratic principle of Parliament’s sovereignty.
No Role for Judicial Review in Amendments: The respondents further argued that the concept of judicial review should not extend to constitutional amendments. They maintained that since Article 368 provides a clear and specific process for amending the Constitution, the judiciary had no role in scrutinizing or second-guessing the decisions made by Parliament. They also pointed out that the Constitution grants the legislature the power to make these changes to adapt to evolving societal needs, and judicial review would limit this flexibility.
Amendments Are Not Subject to Judicial Scrutiny: According to the respondents, the Constitution explicitly provides the means for Parliament to amend itself, and there was no justification for the judiciary to interfere with this process. The respondents argued that such judicial intervention would disrupt the balance of power between the branches of government and lead to judicial overreach, undermining the democratic process.
The Doctrine of ‘Basic Structure’ Is Not Absolute: Some of the respondents also argued that while the Basic Structure Doctrine had been introduced by the Court in earlier cases, it was not a rigid or absolute principle. They suggested that the doctrine should not prevent Parliament from amending the Constitution to address contemporary needs and circumstances. The respondents were cautious of allowing the judiciary to be the final arbiter in deciding what constitutes the “basic structure” of the Constitution, arguing that this could lead to the Court making political or ideological decisions.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Ratio Decidendi (The Principle of Law Decided by the Court):
The notion of the Constitution’s fundamental structure may or may not be violated by a law that denies fundamental rights found in Part III. A law’s legitimacy will be examined and, if applicable, declared invalid by judicial review if it is repealed but still included in the Ninth Schedule.
A statute’s impact on Part III of the Constitution must be taken into account when evaluating whether it contradicts the fundamental framework of the document.
Following the Kesavananda Bharati case’s ruling, any statutes added to the aforementioned schedule will need to be examined in light of the fundamental elements of the Constitution. Therefore, even if a statute is amended to include it in the aforementioned schedule, it could still be challenged on the basis of fundamental rights if it goes against such rights.
A statute’s eligibility for protection under the Ninth Schedule must be assessed by applying the rights test, analyzing the type and degree of fundamental rights violations by the statute, and applying the fundamental structure of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 as well as Articles 14 and 19. According to the proper test, the implications of the amendment—rather than its form—are what matter.
Any statute included in the aforementioned schedule cannot be challenged again if the court upholds it. However, the act could be challenged on the basis of the Constitution’s fundamental structure if it is determined to violate Part III of the Constitution and is still included in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973.
Obiter Dicta (Remarks Made by the Court Beyond the Direct Decision)
The Court took into account the Constitution’s history, purpose, and evolution since its creation. It noted that a thorough analysis of a wide range of issues, including poverty, illiteracy, deprivation, and disparities based on caste, creed, sex, and religion, led to the constitutional framework. Part IV of the Constitution outlines the duties of a welfare state, whereas Part III delineates the significance of fundamental rights, as discussed at the Constituent Assembly. A number of rulings concerning the Ninth Schedule and the Constitutional Amendments were taken into account by the Court.
The distinction between constitutional and parliamentary sovereignty was noted. Judicial review and the rule of law are based on Articles 14, 19, and 21. Since there is no basis for contesting its legitimacy outside of the Constitution, no clause that was drafted or added using the plenary lawmaking power can be considered ultra vires. Therefore, the amendment authority must stay within the bounds of the Constitution. The intent, objective, and implications of adding a particular concept or article to the Constitution’s basic framework must be taken into account to assess whether it is within its purview. The division of powers, for instance, has been regarded as a component of the fundamental framework of the Constitution.
As the parties argued, the Court noted that the authority to add laws to the aforementioned schedule without any predetermined standards had been misused. However, a provision’s legitimacy cannot be assessed solely based on the potential for abuse. Therefore, it is impossible to make any assumptions about the alleged abuse. It was noted that the authority to change and add legislation to the Ninth Schedule involves the total nullification of basic rights. Second, no criteria or characteristics that could be assessed govern the inclusion of statutes in the aforementioned schedule. This leads to a loss of control over fundamental rights and their nullification.
Furthermore, it was noted that the goal of fundamental rights is to promote social progress and revolution by establishing a society free from governmental constraints and coercion. The Constitution’s founders required the government to strike a balance between individual liberty and the general welfare by establishing fundamental rights and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). This equilibrium is a fundamental element of the Constitution. A check on state power is provided by fundamental rights. A statute is therefore totally exempt from Part III of the Constitution, including Article 32, once it is included in the aforementioned schedule.
Moreover, it was noted that while Article 31-B was initially intended to safeguard a small number of laws and statutes, its unbridled and widespread use has resulted in an increase in the number of statutes added to the Ninth Schedule from 13 to 284, demonstrating that it is no longer merely an exception. Lack of standards for the use of these authorities results in a lack of constitutional oversight, which undermines its supremacy and establishes legislative hegemony, as well as a lack of judicial review to question the legality of such laws and authority.
The Court additionally noted that Article 31-B uses imaginary immunity to determine validity. The impact test must be used to determine if the constitutional change is valid. According to the Constitution’s essential structure doctrine, the state must provide justification for the extent of its violations of fundamental rights. Parliament is presumed to be required to enact laws that are consistent with fundamental rights. The Court must determine the extent of invasion. Thus, it is necessary to first ascertain whether fundamental rights have been infringed. Second, its effects must be investigated, and if it turns out that it undermines or modifies the fundamental framework of the Constitution, appropriate action must be taken into consideration.
CONCLUSION
Each of the three pillars of democracy—the legislative, the executive branch, and the judiciary—is required to carry out its duties. Parliament has been given the authority to enact laws and perform other legislative duties. The Constitution specifically mentions the Parliament’s extensive powers. However, the authority to interpret legislation and identify any ambiguities has been delegated to the judiciary. In the current case, one of the Parliament’s powers—that is, the ability to place a statute in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and prevent it from being challenged in court—was contested.
This case is among the most striking and key rulings from the Supreme Court that emphasized the ongoing exploitation of the authority granted to the Parliament in this area and further stopped the abuse by enforcing guidelines. The judges found the legal gaps and provided interpretations. It also emphasized the fundamental structure doctrine of the Constitution and developed a test to ascertain the grounds for a bill’s inclusion in the aforementioned schedule. It further established that judicial review may still be conducted in the event that a statute violates Part III of the Constitution.