Published On: October 28th 2025
Authored By: Ankita Mishra
Banaras Hindu University
Abstract
This paper examines the various factors responsible for the institutional opacity, and also highlights the provisions under the Constitution of India that safeguard judicial independence, like security of tenure, judicial review, etc. This paper also contains a comparison with global models and suggests measures that suit the Indian Constitutional Framework and would help in scrutinizing complaints on judicial misconduct. The opacity of the Collegium system and other controversial cases, like case allocations, indicate sustained accountability gaps. Comparative analysis of the UK, USA, and Canada shows that independence and accountability can coexist through codified procedures, proactive publications of judicial data, enhancing the credibility of the system, and gaining public confidence. The study also provides some reforms, such as reforming the opaque Collegium system, statutory judicial ethics, and monitoring cases and training judges at all levels of public communication, as well as upholding judicial autonomy.
Introduction
To what extent should the Indian Judiciary be independent, and how accountable should it remain to the people?
India’s judiciary is often referred to as the “sentinel on the qui vive” and is given the power to safeguard the Fundamental rights[1]. The Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) held that Judicial Independence is the cornerstone of democracy and is embedded in the Constitution to enable judges to make decisions without any fear or favour. [2]
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” said Lord Acton,[3] emphasizing the need for judicial accountability. The judiciary, regarded as the supreme adjudicator, cannot remain exempt from this principle. The central question is whether it is possible to ensure judicial accountability without compromising independence.
The Constitutional Foundation of Judicial Independence
The framers of the Indian Constitution formulated multiple safeguards to maintain judicial autonomy and devised provisions to shield the judiciary from political interference and executive and legislative influences, which are as follows:
- Security of tenure :
The Constitution establishes the security of tenure to uphold judicial independence. Under Article 124(2) and Article 217(1), judges serve until they reach the designated retirement age, which is sixty-five years for the Supreme Court and sixty-two years for the High Court. Their tenure cannot be arbitrarily shortened by the executive or legislative branches. Removal is only possible through the impeachment process in cases of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity.” These provisions shield the judiciary, allowing judges to make decisions free from external influence.[4]
- Financial independence :
To maintain financial security, the India Constitution under Articles 125 and 221 has empowered the Consolidated Fund of India for the salaries of the judges and additional privileges like pensions, leave benefits, and allowances provided by the law as specified in the Second Schedule.[5]
- Appointments :
The Supreme Court and High Court Judges are appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India under the Collegium system, which emphasizes the judiciary’s role in appointments.[6] Through Articles 124(2) and 217(1), judges are appointed based on merit, ensuring fair selection and preventing executive interference. The President’s formal assent maintains checks and accountability. [7]
- Judicial Review :
Articles 13, 32, 136, 142, and 226 empower the judiciary to conduct Judicial review, invalidating laws and executive actions that breach constitutional mandates.[8] The judiciary’s role is to act as a check, reinforce the separation of powers, and sustain public confidence in impartial judicial verdicts.
Existing Accountability Mechanisms in India
- Impeachment :According to Articles 124(4) and 217, judges of the Supreme Court and High Court can be removed on grounds of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity” by the process of impeachment. In re: Justice V Ramaswami (1993) 4 SCC 1 was the first case related to this and resulted in an unsuccessful impeachment[9].
- The Internal Process: In response to Justice Ramaswami’s unsuccessful impeachment attempt, this system was developed with the intention of creating an internal process to investigate the claims. In the 1995 case of C Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A M Bhattacharjee (5 SCC 457), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of internal procedures that protect the integrity of the system.[10] In accordance with this system, a panel of judges would be assembled by the Chief Justice of India or a High Court to examine the misconduct charges.
- Disrespect for the Law: Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, as well as the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971, give the judiciary the power to penalize contempt. Although it has come under fire for limiting legitimate criticism, its mission is to protect judicial integrity. It is tasked with safeguarding judicial integrity, although it has faced criticism for restricting justified critique. In Re: Prashant Bhushan (2020) SCC Online SC 861, the Supreme Court found a senior advocate guilty of publicly criticizing the judiciary.[11]
Controversial cases on transparency deficit
Judicial Accountability in India has gained urgency with the rise of multiple systemic concerns questioning the integrity and efficiency of the system. The case of the first attempt at impeachment in parliament was: In re: Justice V Ramaswami (1993), related to financial discrepancies and misuse of public funds as Chief Justice during his tenure.[12] This case highlighted that the existing mechanism was insufficient to hold the judges accountable and is referred to as a “ toothless tiger”. A more recent case: In re: Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court (2011), misappropriation of funds resulted in the Rajya Sabha passing an impeachment, marking the first successful instance in Parliament. [13]
The Chief Justice of India is considered the “Master of the Roster”. Although this has been subjected to controversy because of some cases like the Shanti Bhushan v Supreme Court of India 2018, while the court reiterated this discretion, an unprecedented press conference in 2018 was held by four senior judges related to case allocation.[14]
The Collegium System lacks transparency, and it has no codified criteria for either selecting or rejecting judges. Therefore, the attempt to replace the Collegium system with the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) 2014 was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 408 for violating the basic structure.[15] Despite this, the Law Commission of India strongly recommended these reforms in its 230th Report, 2009.
Bridging Comparative Insights and Reforms
The Judicial Appointments Commission under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 in the UK conducts transparent, merit-based selections of judges, lawyers, and laypersons using published criteria and with judges’ and lawyers’ participation. In 2023–24, it conducted approximately 35 selection exercises, received nearly 7,000 applications, and recommended 867 appointments.[16]
Although the Indian judiciary follows a similar method, the key aspect that India’s collegium system lacks is codified selection criteria and public justification for recruitment. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 in the US and the Canadian Judicial Council in Canada are responsible for investigating complaints of judicial misconduct through codified procedures, along with maintaining judicial independence, and involve participation of judges, lawyers, and laypeople to enhance their credibility. [17]
Way forward
Accountability and independence can coexist in a democracy, but they share a delicate and intense relationship; therefore, it is essential to monitor the judiciary. The first step should be to formulate a codified and structured framework for the appointments and transfers. Measures such as compulsory disclosure of judicial records, scores, and selection guidelines would be beneficial. Second, establishing a statutory Judicial Ethics and Conduct Authority to investigate judicial misconduct allegations. Third, implementing real-time case monitoring and publishing asset disclosures would enhance transparency and credibility. Additionally, training judges at all levels and public communication, judicial ethics would be effective. These measures, when combined, can help maintain a balance between systematic accountability and judicial independence.
Conclusion
Judicial responsibility and freedom support the rule of regulation and the legality of representative governance. The Indian judges, while innately enabled to safeguard fundamental rights and uphold the separation of powers, face intrinsic challenges in transparency, assignment processes, and public perception. Mechanisms such as accusation, within processes, contempt capacities provide a foundation for responsibility, but they often linger, especially in the Collegium plan and case allocation practices. Comparative models from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada demonstrate that legal liberty can coexist with transparency, contributing valuable communication for India. Moving forward, formalizing the Collegium scheme, codifying election criteria, establishing a sanctioned legal morality authority, and improving honest-opportunity listening of judicial conduct can together guarantee that responsibility does not compromise liberty. Strengthening these mechanisms is necessary to uphold public trust, strengthen legal integrity, and guarantee that the judges debris as a believable sentinel of the Constitution.
References
[1] State of Madras v VG Row AIR 1952 SC 196.
[2] Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
[3] Lord Acton, Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton (5 April 1887)
[4] Constitution of India 1950, arts 124(2), 217(1), 124(4).
[5] Constitution of India 1950, arts 125, 221; Second Schedule.
[6] Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 408.
[7] Constitution of India 1950, arts 124(2), 217(1).
[8] Constitution of India 1950, arts 13, 32, 136, 142, 226.
[9] In re: Justice V. Ramaswami (1993) 4 SCC 1.
[10] C Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A M Bhattacharjee (5 SCC 457)
[11] In Re: Prashant Bhushan (2020) SCC Online SC 861.
[12] In re: Justice V Ramaswami (1993) (Impeachment proceedings in Parliament).
[13] In re: Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court (2011) 3 SCC 193.
[14] Shanti Bhushan v Supreme Court of India (2018) 8 SCC 396.
[15] Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 408.
[16] UK Judicial Appointments Commission, Annual Report 2023–24 https://judicialappointments.gov.uk/
[17] Judicial Conduct and Disability Act 1980, 28 USC §§ 351–364
