Published On: December 9th 2025
Authored By: Nithyasree S
Govt. Law College, TVPM
Introduction
The evolution of press autonomy in India emerges from the colonial struggle against censorship, taking its modern constitutional shape post-independence. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s outspoken advocacy and judicial contribution mark a landmark chapter in this journey, shaping the balance between freedom and accountability in media jurisprudence. This article explores the legal, historical, and jurisprudential dimensions of press freedom, with a sustained focus on Justice Krishna Iyer’s perspectives, major Supreme Court rulings, and ongoing relevance in a digital era, while maintaining scrupulous citation to legal authorities and judicial texts.
Historical Context: The Roots of Press Freedom
During British rule, the press in India faced repressive regulations such as the Censorship of Press Act 1799 and Licensing Act 1857. These measures were designed to curb dissent and control the spread of nationalist sentiment. The Metcalfe Act of 1835 was a crucial legislative victory, ending restrictive licensing and earning Charles Metcalfe the epithet “Liberator of the Press“. Early newspapers, such as The Bengal Gazette (1780), and reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy utilized the press as a vehicle for social and political change, thereby reinforcing its role as a cornerstone of the independence movement. By the late 19th and 20th centuries, colonial restrictions inspired constitutional discussions about ensuring press freedom within a new, democratic framework.
Press Freedom in the Constitution
The Constituent Assembly recognized the press as an essential democratic institution. Debates revealed contrasting opinions: some advocated a specific constitutional safeguard, others, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, insisted that press freedom flows inherently from Article 19(1)(a)—the right to freedom of speech and expression—making special privileges unnecessary. Ultimately, Indian constitutional law subsumed press freedom within Article 19(1)(a), subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), encompassing national security, public order, decency, and morality.
Justice Krishna Iyer’s Jurisprudence: Judicial Protection of Press Autonomy
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s judicial career exemplified a defense of civil liberties and a progressive interpretation of constitutional rights, particularly concerning the press. He was instrumental in landmark decisions that articulated the practical dimensions of press freedom and interpreted reasonable restrictions in light of democratic necessity.
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1973)
This pivotal case challenged government-imposed restrictions on the import of newsprint, which directly affected newspaper circulation. Justice Krishna Iyer underscored that indirect controls—such as newsprint regulation—amount to a curtailment of press freedom, which Article 19(1)(a) implicitly guarantees. He stated that any restriction undermining the right to circulate ideas or opinions, especially if indirect, is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny and must be justified by a compelling public interest.
Other Key Decisions
Justice Iyer’s wider influence is seen in his opinions in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, where the linkage of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) with Article 19(1)(a) fortified constitutional procedural safeguards for the press; Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985), which ruled that excessive financial burdens or taxation on the press act as indirect censorship; and Janaki Ballav Patnaik v. Bennett Coleman Co. Ltd, affirming that press freedom is never absolute and must be balanced against societal interests.
His approach, refined in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989), put the onus on the state to justify any restriction, emphasizing that censorship is only justifiable where there is a clear, present, and real danger to public interest. This vigilance against arbitrary restrictions was again pivotal in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), which reaffirmed the protection of unpleasant or inconvenient speech as part of democratic discourse.
Legal Foundations and Statutory Constraints on the Press
Press freedom in India is legally circumscribed by reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) and by statutory instruments, including Section 124A IPC (sedition), Section 499 IPC (defamation), and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. These instruments serve a dual purpose: safeguarding societal and state interests while ensuring that press autonomy does not morph into license.
For example, the Supreme Court in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) ruled that only substantial threats to public order could justify restriction of press freedom, not minor disturbances. Similarly, in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965), the Supreme Court upheld that decency and morality were legitimate bases for restricting obscene content.
Justice Iyer, in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar Orissa High Court (1976), cautioned that contempt powers should be exercised only judiciously, to avoid their misuse as instruments of suppression.
The Press as the Fourth Pillar: Iyer’s Philosophy in Practice
Justice Iyer viewed the press not merely as an institution, but as the “Fourth Pillar of Democracy,” charged with the responsibility of maintaining transparency, empowering the marginalized, and holding power accountable. His philosophy emphasized that autonomy must be synchronized with responsibility—media must not become a tool of sensationalism or partisan propaganda. “Freedom without responsibility is anarchy; responsibility without freedom is oppression” is how he encapsulated his doctrine of balance.
He consistently stressed that state intervention is justified only when public order is genuinely imperilled, and that such intervention must be demonstrable, necessary, and proportionate, not arbitrary or excessive.
Challenges to Press Autonomy: Contemporary Issues
In the digital era, new threats have emerged: corporate consolidation of media ownership, proliferation of digital misinformation, and increased governmental overreach via broad security laws have collectively undermined the watchdog role of the press. Justice Iyer’s focus on diversity and anti-trust measures remains critical, especially as monopolization and technological change continue to reshape the landscape.
The chilling effect of state laws, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Official Secrets Act, remains contentious, often producing self-censorship or penalizing journalists under the guise of national security. Harassment and violence against investigative journalists exacerbate this decline in true editorial independence.
Ethically, media trials, sensationalist reporting, and the erosion of fact-based journalism are compounding challenges to the integrity of press freedom. Justice Iyer’s philosophy underscores the urgent need for internal reform, ethical standards, and robust fact-checking to rebuild public trust.
Global Comparisons
A comparative analysis reveals that India’s press freedom, though significant, is more restricted than in the United States, where the First Amendment grants explicit and robust protection, requiring proof of “actual malice” in defamation cases involving public figures. In the United Kingdom, common law and statutes like the Official Secrets Act primarily safeguard reputational and state interests, rather than the press as an explicit constitutional right. Conversely, in countries like North Korea, state control eliminates any autonomy, starkly highlighting the necessity of continued legal vigilance in India.
The Way Forward: Legal Reforms and Justice Iyer’s Continuing Legacy
Justice Iyer’s interpretive framework—insisting on proportionality, necessity, and fairness—serves as a guiding beacon for legal and institutional reforms. Legislative and judicial safeguards must prevent the misuse of defamation, sedition, and contempt laws, foster equitable media ownership, strengthen whistleblower protection, and promote technological mechanisms for factual reporting and inclusive access.
The creation of independent regulatory bodies, increased training for journalists, and public awareness regarding ethical reporting are practical avenues to reinforce the fourth pillar’s foundational role.
Conclusion
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s conception of press freedom as both a right and a responsibility continues to inspire Indian constitutional jurisprudence. His nuanced understanding—that press autonomy is a democratic imperative, yet always accountable to public interest and the rule of law—frames the path for contemporary and future challenges. As digital platforms redefine journalism and as threats to press independence persist, his doctrine urges all stakeholders to vigilantly preserve, reform, and advance the autonomy of the press, securing its status as “the soul of a vibrant democracy“.
References
- Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 788; AIR 1973 SC 106; 1973 2 SCR 757 SC.
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; AIR 1978 SC 597.
- Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641; AIR 1986 SC 515.
- Janaki Ballav Patnaik v. Bennett Coleman Co. Ltd, 1988 LawSuit Ori 42 Orissa HC.
- S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
- Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523; 2015 5 SCC 1 SC.
- Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
- Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881.
- Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar Orissa High Court, (1976) 3 SCC 327.
