Plea Bargaining in India: Scope, Benefits, and Challenges

Abstract

The implementation of plea bargaining in India can greatly alleviate its massive judicial backlog. This study examines the socially constructed goods and infrastructures the system creates alongside its challenges. India’s current utilization of plea-bargaining amounts to 0.11 percent of all criminal cases. The potential societal benefits are significant—for instance, prison overcrowding, resource mismanagement, and delay are only some of the challenges that can be alleviated. Culturally, circumspection is one of the major contributors to the identified gaps, as strong legislative judgments and practice analogies freeze core legal-ethical social dilemmas. Addressing these concerns by removing rigid upper-age caps, targeted demographic awareness campaigns, and relaxing complicated procedural frameworks can help. If these sociological issues are addressed, India could maintain the core tenets of its justice system while transforming its global position by placing plea bargaining at the center of its judicial reform.

Introduction

India faces perennial challenges in the form of a severe backlog in its justice system, and as of 2024 the country is facing a staggering 5.1 crore pending cases with an average of over 30 months for resolving criminal trials.[1] This, coupled with prison overcrowding, has been a growing concern as approximately 76% of inmates are pre-trial detainees.[2] To address this issue the plea bargaining system was introduced with The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2005’s, Where it was incorporated into Chapter XXI A of the CrPC. Like many other attempts in legislative ‘modernization’ of the affair, this case law was purposefully designed to fit the Indian system [3] The affair permits the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than the original charge, after undergoing negotiations. While this will aid in reallocating resources, the contributing frameworks are far more intricate shrouded in cultural obstacles.[4] This paper focuses the analysis towards the anticipated scope, advantages and disadvantages of the concept whilst strengthening arguments for system changes that would make the fully exploitable for justice.

Legal Framework and Evolution

Historical Context and Legislative Journey

The plea bargain system was a throning issue within Indian jurisprudence. In the case State Of Uttar Pradesh V Chandrika (1999) the Supreme Court rejected it on public policy grounds with the statement “justice cannot be bartered.” [5] Also, in Kachhia Patel Shantilal Koderlal V. State of Gujarat (1980) the court also declared sentence bargaining to be unconstitutional calling it “unconstitutional” due to the rampant cases of defendants pleading innocent.[6]

A shift occured with Law Commission’s Report 142 (1991) which recognized the backlog of pending cases along with the usefulness of plea bargaining,[7] and also Reports 154 (1996) And 177 (2001) which focused on enhancing procedural safeguards.[8] These recommendataions were eventually included in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2005 which added new Chapter 21A (Sections 265A–265L) to the CrPC.[9] The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023 bill retained the provisions but sought to amend the the timeframe of resolution proposing a 30-day window to submit application post charge framing.[10]

Procedural Mechanics and Safeguards

Exclusion under Section 265A includes, Women, minors under 14, and socio-economic offenders of (Corruption and Terrorism).[11] As constituents, the procedure involves:

1. Voluntary Application: The accused must take initiative by way of an affidavit, which must be filed with a written submission denying any form of coercion and explaining the process involving.[12]
2. Victim Involvement: 265D permits increase in the compensation amount to be sought by the victims and makes the negotiation process beneficial to them.[13] Consider the 2023 fraud incident in Delhi, The victims who were defrauded received a payment in the form of plea bargain settlement, which was ₹5 lakh.[14]
3. Judicial Oversight: Under suitable sub judicial oversight, a court exercises control over the abuses of settlement agreements as to fairness and reasonableness, while at the same time shield the parties from imposition of abuse, capping punishment to one fourth (1⁄4) of maximum sentence and attestation to adherence to procedural fairness.[15]

In spite of such measures, the addition of victim’s affidavit and consent makes the situation worse in terms of active nonparticipation especially among poor defendants with limited access to legal aid.[16]

Scope and Comparative Analysis

Domestic Limitations and Eligibility Criteria

In India, the provisions of plea bargaining do not cover violent crimes or socio-economic offenses like dowry harassment (section 498A of IPC).[17] Money laundering which are not extendable beyond 7 years imprisonment able sentence covering petty theft, forgery and other non-violent crimes.[18] The scope for plea bargains is wider in the United States where 90 to 98 percent of cases, even more serious offenses, are resolved through plea bargained settlements.[19]

Global Perspectives: Lessons from the U.S. and U.K.

In the legal framework of the US, charge bargaining constitutes part of the prosecutor’s discretion where he relinquishes certain grave charges in return for a guilty plea.[20] An instance of this is the ability to change a murder charge into one for manslaughter.[21] This middle-ground approach does possess problematic issues surrounding fairness. The UK created a mix policy with the Sentencing Council Guidelines which allocated certain reductions in sentence for specific pleas, such as 25-33% for early guilty pleas, which juxtaposes rigid policies with flexible criteria.[22]

This system places a premium on judicial mery and compassion geared towards the victims while being unique in lacking such mercy and producing systematically irrational diversity in outcomes.[23] In a 2021 study published by National Law University, New Delhi, 68% of respondents stated that they had a negative perception of plea bargaining, largely because of how complex and drawn out the process seemed.[24]

Benefits of Plea Bargaining

Alleviating Case Backlog and Prison Overcrowding

Plea bargaining serves India’s 5.5 lakh prisoners, 76% of which are undertrials.[25] In State of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor (2005), the Gujarat High Court sanctioned its use for alleviating prison overcrowding and observed that pretrial detainees frequently endure much longer periods of confinement than the sentences they would likely receive if convicted.[26] A 2022 incident in Mumbai saw 12 undertrials charged with petty theft accepting plea deals at court. This, in turn, saved judicial resources that could be allocated towards more serious criminal matters.[27]

Victim-Centric Restorative Justice

Section 265D states that the act of soliciting compensation from a victim encompasses restorative justice. Victims of economic crimes, for example, can recover losses far more efficiently in terms of time than if they engaged in years of courtroom litigation. In a 2023 fraud case in Chennai involving ₹50 lakh, victims arranged to get back 80% of compensation within four months due to plea arrangements instead of a three year trial.[28]

Cost and Time Efficiency

A typical criminal trial in India comes with approximately ₹3-5 lakh in legal costs, in addition to 30 months of time spent in litigation.[29] This, in turn, overextends the finances of both the litigants and the state. Utilizing plea bargaining, litigating time is cut down to 6-8 months and the cost is reduced by over 60-70%.[30] A study carried out in Karnataka in 2024 found these cases, on average, to be settled at ₹1.2 lakh, while contested trials brought in ₹4.5 lakh.[31]

Challenges and Criticisms

Structural and Systemic Barriers

1. Limited Scope: More effective approaches are within reach, but a lack of effective strategies hinders implementation. An IDIA report from this year states that 82% of rural litigants are unaware of plea bargaining.[32]
2. Rigid Procedures: Outside of securing the victim’s agreement, there is no room beyond filing affidavits windows.[33] In P. J. Joseph v State of Kerala (2013), the Kerala High Court dismissed one such plea on the basis that the person giving the affidavit had already become a victim of the court’s procedural inflexibility.[34]
3. Judicial Resistance: A good number of magistrates, perhaps out of excessive convenience, will believe in the concept of ‘negotiated justice’ on account of their exposure to the adversarial system. In 2022, a survey found that 54% of all district judges perceived active plea bargaining to be detrimental to the dignity of trials. [35]

Ethical and Constitutional Concerns

Critics argue plea bargaining risks:

• Wrongful Convictions Due to Overly Coercive Tactics: Indigent defendants may plead guilty without contest simply to not incur further expenses. This is what happened in Bihar in 2021 when 22 percent of bargain pleaders subsequently claimed to have been framed.[36]
• Favouritism Bias: Self-contained discussions are biased because they lack public scrutiny.[37]
• Class Distinction: The gap is worsened by skilled attorneys making money off a wealthy accused individual’s preferential deal.[38]

Case Law and Judicial Evolution

Pre-2005 Resistance and Post-Legislation Shifts

In Thippaswamy v. The State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court ruled that any guilty plea bargains that amount to inducements are an infringement of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty).[39] Post 2005, courts were very slow to adopt the mechanism, which was used cautiously. In Surendra Singh v. State of Utranchal (2021), the High Court dismissed appeal of a theft accused citing the appellant did not establish the Section 265B hurdle properly.[40]

Emerging Trends Post-BNSS 2023

The 30-day submission window laid out by the BNSS aims to address procedural lags, but preliminary evaluation offers divergent conclusions.[41] Engagement in Maharashtra was considerably lower: of 15,000 eligible cases, only 120 participated in plea bargaining in 2023 (0.08%). Public apathy was identified as a major contributing factor to this in 2023.[42]

Recommendations for Reform

Policy and Procedural Reforms

1. Expand Acceptable Criteria: Non-violent offenses such as narcotics trafficking and tax evasion should be accepted provided violent offenses are excluded.[43]
2. Establishing Uniform Reduction Levels: Set ceilings for early sentence reductions at no less than 25% in order to mitigate the plead based sentencing disparity.[44]
3. Establish Virtual Platforms: For affidavit filing, create platforms for virtual negotiations, commencing with pilot projects in Bangalore and Delhi.[45]

Institutional and Awareness Measures

1. Targeted Specific Pleading Courts: Establish fad plea bargaining courts in areas with backlogs in plea deals.[46]
2. Strengthening Legal Aid Services: Reallocate Resources for Outreach Programs to Underserved Indigent Defendants by NALSA Legal Aid.[47]
3. Outreach Campaigns: Collaborate with NGOs for simplification workshops in outreach regions.[48] 

Conclusion

In India, plea bargaining has a bundle of features. It serves a certain purpose and, to an extent, requires institutional integration as well as automation to the existing legal framework. The modern structure of plea bargaining incorporates restorative justice as one of its aims, although these changes are accompanied by more fundamental processes such as streamlined processes, expanded discretion, reshaped judicial attitudes, and institutional cultural shifts. Even though the BNSS 2023 reforms strive to resolve these concerns,[49] there is still more to be done in order for Indian plea bargaining to claim constitutional curiosity status. At the moment, India, in the name of sustaining balance, hovers at the equilibrium of inefficiency and inequity, which enables countless injustices to thrive within the system. Fulfilling hopes in the swift progression toward modernized backlog resolution would support victims of crime by shifting restorative justice perceptions and leveraging the initiatives.

 

References

[1] National Judicial Data Grid, Pending Cases Report (2024)

[2] National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics India 2022.

[3] Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005.

[4] Law Commission of India, 177^th Report on The Criminal Justice System (2001).

[5] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandrika, AIR 1999 SC 164.

[6] Kachhia Patel Shantilal Koderlal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 531.

[7] Law Commission of India, 142nd Report (1991).

[8] Law Commission of India, 154th Report (1996).

[9] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 265A–265L.

[10] Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 290.

[11] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 265A(2)

[12] P.J. Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 2345.

[13] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 265D.

[14] Delhi District Court Records, State v. Rajesh Kumar (2023).

[15] State of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor, (2005) 1 GLR 709.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 265A.

[18] U.S. Department of Justice, State Court Processing Statistics (2021).

[19] Sentencing Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (U.K., 2020)

[20] National Law University Delhi, Efficiency of Plea Bargaining in India (2021)

[21] IDIA, Access to Justice Survey (2023).

[22] Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2021 SCC OnLine Utt 689.

[23] Maharashtra Judicial Department, Annual Report 2023

[24] National Law University Delhi, Efficiency of Plea Bargaining in India (2021).

[25] National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics India 2022

[26] State of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor, (2005) 1 GLR 709.

[27] Maharashtra Judicial Department, Annual Report 2023.

[28] Chennai District Court Records, State v. Ramesh Kumar (2023).

[29] IDIA (Increasing Diversity by Increasing Access), Access to Justice Survey (2023)

[30] National Judicial Data Grid, Pending Cases Report (2024).

[31] Karnataka Study on Plea Bargaining Costs, Indian Institute of Justice Research (2024)

[32] IDIA, Access to Justice Survey (2023).

[33] Law Commission of India, 154th Report on Simplifying Criminal Procedures (1996).

[34] P.J. Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC Online Ker 2345.

[35] Judicial Training Academy Survey, Maharashtra (2022).

[36] Bihar Legal Studies Institute, Impact of Plea Bargaining on Undertrials, (2021).

[37] Comparative Analysis Report on Plea Bargaining Transparency, NLU Delhi (2021).

[38] SSRN Paper on Class Disparities in Plea Bargaining Outcomes (2023).

[39] Thippaswamy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 747.

[40] Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, SCC OnLine Uttarakhand (2021).

[41] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Section 290 (2023).

[42] Maharashtra Judicial Department, Annual Report (2023).

[43] NDPS Act Amendment Report by Legislative Research Unit (2022).

[44] Sentencing Council Guidelines on Guilty Pleas Reduction (U.K., 2020).

[45] Digital Justice Initiative Report by NITI Aayog (2024).

[46] High Court Proposal for Dedicated Plea-Bargaining Benches in Backlogged Districts (2023).

[47] NALSA Annual Outreach Report on Legal Aid Awareness Campaigns (2022).

[48] NGO Collaboration Report on Rural Legal Literacy Programs by PRS Legislative Research (2024).

[49] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Legislative Commentary by Bar Council of India (2024).