Quasi-Federal or Unitary in Disguise? A Critical Analysis of Union-State Power Sharing in the Indian Constitutional Framework

Abstract

This study examines the distribution of powers between the Union and the States within the Indian federal framework. The Indian Constitution has given rise to a unique federal structure described as “quasi-federal” or a “federation with a unitary bias,” which distinguishes the Indian model from classical federal systems. Using doctrinal legal research methodology, this study critically assesses the legislative, administrative, and financial dimensions of Union-State relations as envisaged in the constitutional framework and as shaped through judicial pronouncements. By analysing landmark cases including State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963),[1] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994),[2] and Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018), the study demonstrates that the judiciary has played a decisive role in shaping Indian federalism. The study finds that the Indian federal system contains inherent centralising tendencies alongside aspirations for regional autonomy, most visibly in fiscal federalism arrangements and the operation of emergency provisions.

I. Introduction

Federalism is one of the most important constitutional mechanisms for governing a diverse society, seeking to balance national integration with regional autonomy. India’s choice of a federal form of government reflects the need to preserve its vast diversity while maintaining a strong central structure. This study examines the constitutional allocation of powers between the Union and the States, situating it within its conceptual background and across seven decades of Indian constitutionalism.[3]

B.R. Ambedkar,[4] the chief architect of the Constitution, observed before the Constituent Assembly: “The Constituent Assembly has used the description ‘a Union of States.’ In other words, we are a federation with a unitary bias.” This formulation captured the founding vision — a state that is formally federal but structurally inclined toward central authority, a tension that continues to define Indian constitutional law.

II. Legislative Relations Between Union and States

The constitutional distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States is not merely theoretical — it carries significant practical consequences for governance in India. This section examines how these constitutional provisions operate in practice, surveying key legislative developments, areas of conflict, and emerging trends in Union-State legislative relations.

Parliamentary Legislation on State Subjects

Parliament has exercised its authority to legislate on state subjects under the following exceptional circumstances:

i. Under Rajya Sabha Resolution (Article 249):
a. The Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, was enacted after a Rajya Sabha resolution authorised Parliament to legislate on this state subject.
b. More recently, the resolution mechanism was considered for nationwide legislation on water conservation, though ultimately not pursued.

ii. During Emergencies (Article 250):
a. During the national emergency of 1962, Parliament enacted the Defence of India Act covering several state subjects.[5]
b. During the 1975–77 Emergency, Parliament enacted several laws on state subjects, including the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

iii. With State Consent (Article 252):
a. The Prize Competitions Act, 1955, was enacted initially for consenting states and later adopted by others.[6]
b. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, was enacted through this route.

iv. For Implementation of Treaties (Article 253):
a. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, though arguably covering state subjects, was enacted pursuant to India’s international human rights obligations.
b. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, gave effect to principles enshrined in the Stockholm Declaration.[7]
c. The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, implemented the Convention on Biological Diversity and touched upon agriculture and forest management — subjects ordinarily within the State List.

Concurrent Legislative Powers: Cooperation and Conflict

The Concurrent List has facilitated both cooperative and conflictual legislative dynamics:

i. Framework Legislation by Parliament:
On concurrent subjects, Parliament often enacts framework legislation laying down general principles, leaving implementation to the states:
a. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, set national standards for forest protection while leaving forest management to states.
b. The Right to Education Act, 2009, established national norms but left implementation mechanisms to individual states.
c. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, fulfilled international commitments while permitting state-specific adaptations.[8]

ii. State Variations on Concurrent Subjects:
a. Labour laws: While Parliament has enacted the Industrial Disputes Act and Factories Act, states such as Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan have enacted far-reaching amendments creating distinct regional labour regimes.
b. Land acquisition: Following the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013,[9] states such as Tamil Nadu and Gujarat enacted laws with considerable variations.
c. Environmental regulation: States have supplemented central Water and Air Pollution Control Acts with state-specific standards and enforcement mechanisms.

iii. Presidential Assent for State Laws (Article 254(2)):
a. Maharashtra’s land acquisition law received Presidential assent to override certain provisions of the central legislation.[10]
b. Tamil Nadu’s law permitting Jallikattu received Presidential assent despite its variance with the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.
c. Gujarat’s labour law amendments received Presidential assent modifying the applicability of central labour laws.

Recent Legislative Developments: GST and Fiscal Federalism

The 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016, which established the Goods and Services Tax regime, fundamentally altered fiscal federalism:[11]

— It curtailed states’ independent taxation powers over sales tax, entry tax, and related levies.
— It established the GST Council as a joint decision-making body with representation from both the Union and the states.
— It created a compensation mechanism for revenue losses during the transition period.

The subsequent implementation revealed a mixed record of cooperation and conflict. States including Tamil Nadu raised concerns that the structure would erode fiscal autonomy. In Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022),[12] the Supreme Court clarified that GST Council recommendations are not binding on states, thereby preserving some measure of state fiscal autonomy.

III. Case Law Analysis

1. State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)[13]

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the central legislation and rejected the West Bengal government’s challenge. Chief Justice Sinha articulated a foundational characterisation of Indian federalism, holding: “The Constitution of India is not federal in the same sense as the Constitution of the United States of America. In describing the Constitution of India as Federal, too much elaboration has often been laid on what has been borrowed from the Constitution of the United States of America.”

This decision established the foundational judicial perspective that Indian federalism is “quasi-federal” rather than fully federal. It recognised the constitutional tilt toward strong central power while retaining federal features — a construction that permitted Union intervention into ordinarily state domains on the strength of Union List entries.

2. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977)[14]

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and significantly reinforced central authority. The Court held that states lacked locus standi to challenge the Union’s directives or potential proclamations under Article 356, as this was a constitutional power vested in the President. Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed that presidential satisfaction regarding the failure of constitutional machinery in a state was virtually beyond judicial review, except in cases of mala fide action. The Court affirmed that the Indian Constitution provides for a strong central government with emergency powers capable of validly overriding state autonomy.

3. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)[15]

In a landmark judgment delivered by a nine-judge bench, the Supreme Court fundamentally reinterpreted Article 356 and laid down essential safeguards for the federal structure:

1. The Court held that a Presidential proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review — a departure from State of Rajasthan. While the Court cannot review the President’s subjective satisfaction, it can review the material on which that satisfaction was based.
2. Justices P.B. Sawant and Kuldip Singh observed: “Federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution and the power of the President under Article 356 cannot be exercised in a manner which will be violative of this basic feature.”
3. The Court held that a loss of majority in the Legislative Assembly must be determined on the floor of the House, not by the Governor’s subjective assessment.
4. The Court directed that a proclamation must receive parliamentary approval within two months and that courts have the power to order restoration of a dissolved Assembly if the proclamation is found unconstitutional.
5. The Court held that Article 356 is an extraordinary power, to be invoked only as a last resort to sustain constitutional governance in a state.

Effect of Judgment: This decision dramatically curtailed the arbitrary use of Article 356 and reinforced federal values in Indian constitutionalism. It effectively corrected the excessive centralisation endorsed by earlier jurisprudence and remains the leading authority on the limits of central emergency power over states.

IV. Critical Analysis

The Indian federation maintains a delicate balance between unity and diversity. This section analyses the distribution of political power between the Union and the states against the backdrop of this structural tension.

Centralisation Trends: Constitutional Design and Political Reality

Indian federalism exhibits a bias toward centralisation attributable to both constitutional design choices and evolving political realities. The framers of the Constitution, shaped by the trauma of Partition, deliberately created a federal system that would be federal in form but heavily centralised in substance. The first four decades after independence saw relatively unchecked central dominance, facilitated by single-party rule at both the Union and state levels. Centralisation reached its peak during the Indira Gandhi era, when Article 356 was frequently invoked to dismiss opposition-led state governments.

The Supreme Court’s decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)[16] provided a significant judicial check on this tendency by affirming federalism as a basic feature of the Constitution. Nevertheless, centralising tendencies persist through national policy schemes encroaching on state subjects, legislative resort to the Concurrent List, and financial pressure exercised through Centrally Sponsored Schemes.

Coalition Politics and Federal Bargaining

The rise of coalition politics in the 1990s proved transformative for Union-State relations. Regional parties gained unprecedented influence in national politics, producing what scholar Louise Tillin has described as “bargaining federalism.”[17] Coalition governments such as the NDA (1998–2004) and the UPA (2004–2014) were compelled to accommodate regional political interests through policy concessions and consultative processes. However, the re-establishment of majority government after 2014 has raised questions about whether bargaining federalism represented a structural shift or merely a contingent political arrangement — suggesting that constitutional and political federalism do not always move in tandem.

Asymmetric Federalism

The Indian constitutional framework incorporates significant asymmetric provisions under Articles 370 (now abrogated), 371, and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules. These provisions enabled regions with distinct historical, cultural, and tribal identities to be integrated into the Union on differentiated terms. The abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 represents the most consequential recent development in asymmetric federalism, fundamentally altering the relationship between the Union and Jammu and Kashmir, and raising enduring questions about the constitutional permissibility and prudential wisdom of such alterations to federal asymmetries.

Fiscal Federalism: The Resource Imbalance

Fiscal relations represent one of the most consequential dimensions of federal power-sharing. Despite constitutional provisions for revenue sharing, states face structural constraints on fiscal autonomy. The Centre collects approximately 65–70% of total tax revenues while states bear approximately 60% of total expenditure responsibilities — a vertical fiscal imbalance that necessitates substantial intergovernmental transfers. The GST regime, introduced in 2017, further curtailed independent state taxation powers, though the GST Council provides a formal mechanism for joint decision-making. The economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the acute vulnerability of state finances, demonstrating how financial dependence can undercut constitutional autonomy in practice.

Emerging Challenges

Several contemporary developments continue to test Indian federalism. “One Nation” policy initiatives — spanning taxation (GST), agricultural markets (farm law reforms), elections (simultaneous elections), and education (NEET) — have consistently pitted centralisation imperatives against state rights. Technology-driven governance and data regulation raise new jurisdictional questions that cut across established federal divisions. Transboundary environmental challenges, including climate change, river water disputes, and air pollution, demand multi-level governance responses that the existing federal framework is not always well-equipped to provide.

V. Conclusion

Indian federalism represents a novel constitutional experiment that resists easy categorisation. Unlike classical federations formed through the coming together of pre-existing sovereign units, Indian federalism was adopted as an instrument of national governance in a newly independent state that chose to honour its internal diversity. The result is what the Supreme Court has aptly described as a “federation with a strong centralising tendency.”

The imbalance in constitutional power-sharing is reflected in the expansive Union List, Parliament’s power to legislate on state subjects during emergencies, the emergency provisions under Articles 352 to 360, the institution of All India Services, and the appointment of Governors. Yet the Indian constitutional framework also incorporates countervailing mechanisms: the State List, the Concurrent List with its requirement of presidential assent for repugnant state laws, the Finance Commission’s revenue-sharing mandate, and an independent judiciary empowered to enforce federal boundaries. The trajectory of Indian federalism — shaped equally by constitutional text, judicial interpretation, and political contingency — suggests that the balance between Union and state power will remain a live and contested question in Indian constitutionalism.

References

[1] State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241.
[2] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
[3] Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
[4] Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 33 (1948) (statement of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar).
[5] The Defence of India Act, 1962, No. 51, Acts of Parliament, 1962.
[6] The Prize Competitions Act, 1955, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1955.
[7] B.D. Dua, Federal Constitutions and Emergency Powers: A Comparative Study, 12 J. Const. & Parliamentary Stud. 45 (1978).
[8] Balveer Arora, Adapting Federalism to India: Multilevel and Asymmetrical Innovations, 38 Publius 52 (2008).
[9] The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, No. 30, Acts of Parliament, 2013.
[10] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty in India, 18 J. Democracy 70 (2007).
[11] Sujit Choudhry & Nathan Hume, Federalism, Devolution and Secession, 60 U. Toronto L.J. 231 (2010).
[12] Union of India v. Mohit Minerals, (2022) 7 SCC 401.
[13] State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241.
[14] State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361.
[15] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
[16] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
[17] Louise Tillin, Indian Federalism 45–68 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019).