The 129th Amendment Bill: A Critical Analysis of “One Nation, One Election”.

Abstract

The 129th Amendment Bill, recommended by the Kovind Committee[1] chaired by former President of India Shri Ram Nath Kovind, generally refers to simultaneous elections, or One Nation One Election. The Bill was tabled in the Lok Sabha in December 2024 by the Law Minister of India, Arjun Ram Meghwal, after a 90-minute debate. It was passed for introduction by 263 votes in favour and 198 against[2] — a simple majority, whereas a Constitutional amendment ultimately requires a two-thirds majority. The Bill aims to synchronise elections across the Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies, and Local Bodies (Panchayats and Municipalities) by 2029 or 2034. Critics highlight not only the Bill’s advantages but also its disadvantages, including the risk of excessive dominance by the Union Government and a possible encroachment on the basic structure of the Constitution.[3] The Bill therefore occupies a controversial position in public discourse. This paper presents a critical analysis of the constitutional challenges posed by the One Nation One Election Bill.

I. Introduction

The 129th Amendment Bill, also known as the One Nation One Election Bill, aims to synchronise elections across India. As the world’s largest democracy, India holds elections almost every year, often across different states or Union Territories. Since Independence, over 400 elections[4] have been held across the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. The Bill’s stated aim is to reduce election expenditure, but it has also raised concerns about encroachment on the basic structure of the Constitution.[3] While the Bill was passed for introduction, it has not yet secured the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment. Under simultaneous elections, the Lok Sabha, State Assembly, and Local Body elections would be held at the same time, possibly on a single day. The 131st Amendment Bill, also known as the Delimitation Bill, is linked to One Nation One Election. This Bill aims to increase the number of Lok Sabha seats from the current 543 to 850, based on the 2011 census — even as the 2027 census remains pending. This Bill has not yet passed in the Lok Sabha.

II. Historical Background

India gained Independence on 15 August 1947. The first general elections were held in 1951–52.[4] In the early years, general elections were held simultaneously, as the present Bill proposes to restore. This practice continued until 1967, and broke down due to the premature dissolution of certain State Assemblies in 1968 and 1969. The first instance was Kerala: in 1959,[5] President’s Rule was invoked by the Nehru Government to dismiss the Communist-led state government of E.M.S. Namboodiripad, with fresh elections following in 1960. This marked the beginning of the end of the synchronised election cycle, which broke down fully by 1967. The Fourth Lok Sabha was dissolved early, in 1970, with new elections held in 1971. The Fifth Lok Sabha was extended beyond its term due to the National Emergency imposed by the Congress Government under Indira Gandhi. Collectively, these events led to the breakdown of simultaneous elections in India.

III. The 129th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2024

The 129th Constitutional Amendment Bill comprises two Bills:

1. The Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill
2. The Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill

The first Bill provides for the synchronisation of Lok Sabha and State elections, while the second extends this framework to the Union Territories and the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

IV. The Constitutional Framework and Necessary Amendments

Three existing constitutional provisions are central to the One Nation One Election framework:

1. Article 83 — Duration of the Houses of Parliament
2. Article 172 — Duration of State Legislatures
3. Article 327 — Power of Parliament to make provisions with respect to elections to legislatures

Article 83, and how ONOE[6] affects it

Article 83 of the Indian Constitution[7] governs the duration of the Houses of Parliament.

Rajya Sabha: The Rajya Sabha, also known as the Council of States, is the upper house of Parliament. It is a permanent body, not subject to dissolution, and is composed of members chosen by State and Union Territory Legislatures. One-third of its members retire every two years, meaning the House is fully reconstituted, in effect, once every six years.

Lok Sabha: The Lok Sabha, or House of the People, is the lower house of Parliament. It is subject to dissolution every five years. Its members are elected by adult suffrage under a First-Past-the-Post system to represent their respective constituencies for a term of five years, unless dissolved earlier by the President.

ONOE affects Article 83 in that, where the Lok Sabha is dissolved prematurely, the next Lok Sabha would serve only the unexpired portion of the original term. For example, if the Lok Sabha is dissolved after three years and four months, the next Lok Sabha would serve only the remaining twenty months. Pending Bills before the dissolved House would lapse, as they ordinarily do at the end of a full term.

Article 172, and how ONOE affects it

Article 172 governs the duration of State Legislatures. The same principle of premature dissolution that applies to the Lok Sabha would also apply to State Assemblies under the proposed framework.

Article 327, and how ONOE affects it

Article 327 empowers Parliament to make provisions with respect to elections to the legislature. Since the 129th Amendment requires simultaneous elections, Parliament would need to amend existing provisions to ensure synchronisation, making this Article central to the Amendment.

V. Proposed Amendments

Article 82A would mandate that all State Assemblies elected after the “Appointed Date” have their terms end simultaneously with the expiry of the Lok Sabha’s full five-year term. It comprises six clauses:

Article 82A(1) — Timeline of Implementation: The President shall announce the date of the first sitting of the Lok Sabha.

Article 82A(2) — Curtailed Tenure of State Assemblies: The tenure of State Assemblies shall be curtailed to align with the appointed date of the Lok Sabha elections.

Article 82A(3) — Election Commission’s Role: The Election Commission is tasked with conducting simultaneous elections.

Article 82A(4) — Definition of Simultaneous Elections: Defined as the general election constituting the House of the People and all Legislative Assemblies together.

Article 82A(5) — Exception: The Election Commission of India may recommend postponement of an election. Where an election is postponed for any reason, the President has the power to direct that it be held separately.

Article 82A(6) — Alignment of Deferred Elections: Where any Assembly election is deferred, its term shall nonetheless be deemed to end with that of the Lok Sabha.

VI. The High-Level Committee

The High-Level Committee, chaired by former President of India Shri Ram Nath Kovind and known as the Kovind Committee, submitted its report on One Nation One Election in March 2024. Constituted on 2 September 2023, the Committee submitted a report comprising 18,626 pages to the then-President of India, Smt. Droupadi Murmu. The Committee’s consultation process included input from 47 political parties and 21,558 responses from across India, among other stakeholders. Following these consultations, the Committee recommended[8] a two-step process:

1. Simultaneous elections would be held for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies.
2. Elections to Local Bodies (Municipalities and Panchayats) would be synchronised with those of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, to be held within 100 days of the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assembly elections.

The Committee also recommended the use of a Single Electoral Roll and Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC) across all three tiers of government.[9] Its proposals were structured to require minimal constitutional amendment while aiming to conduct elections with greater transparency.

VII. Federal Impact of One Nation One Election

Federalism is a system in which power is divided between a Central Authority (the Union Government) and Regional Authorities (States or Provinces).[10] The Central Authority addresses matters of national interest, while Regional Authorities handle the day-to-day administration of their respective states or provinces, with both levels of government exercising power independently of each other. While only 25 of the world’s 193 countries follow a federal system, their citizens account for roughly 40% of the world’s population — meaning most large countries are federal in structure.[10] Federalism forms part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. At the same time, Article 1 of the Constitution declares that “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States,” reflecting a strong centralising tendency in India’s governance. For this reason, India is often described as a Quasi-Federal country, a structure adapted from the Canadian model: India follows a broadly federal structure during stable periods but shifts toward a more unitary system during a national emergency.[11] ONOE is said to encroach on this federal structure in the following ways:

Curtailing the Five-Year Term

Article 83 of the Constitution governs the tenure of the two Houses of Parliament. While the Rajya Sabha, as a permanent house, does not dissolve, the Lok Sabha dissolves every five years. Article 83(2) specifically provides that the Lok Sabha shall continue for five years from the date of its first sitting, except in cases of premature dissolution. A similar tenure applies to State Legislative Assemblies under Article 172(1). The word “shall” has generally been treated as mandatory in judicial interpretation: in State of Haryana & Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal,[12] the Court observed that the word “shall” is ordinarily construed as mandatory unless the statutory scheme indicates otherwise. On this basis, the five-year term may be understood as a constitutionally protected entitlement for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, subject only to constitutionally valid premature dissolution. The proposed Article 82A seeks to align the tenure of State Legislative Assemblies with that of the Lok Sabha, irrespective of how much of their own term remains. If implemented, this arrangement could, in principle, allow a future government to manipulate term limits to consolidate power — raising the concern that such an amendment could erode the basic structure of the Constitution.

Potential for Misuse of Article 356

Article 356, commonly known as President’s Rule, places a State under the direct control of the Union Government. Historically, this provision has been used for political ends: according to the Sarkaria Commission Report of 1988,[13] roughly one-third of all impositions of President’s Rule were found to have been politically motivated. This pattern raised serious concerns for the basic structure of the Constitution until the Supreme Court, in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,[14] held that the imposition of President’s Rule must be exercised with caution and is subject to judicial review. The ONOE Bill arguably increases the risk of such misuse, as it leaves certain gaps in its provisions on curtailment. For instance, if a State has completed four years of its term with one year remaining, holding a separate election for that final year would increase expenditure — the very outcome the Bill seeks to avoid.

Excessive Direction to the Election Commission of India

Free and fair elections are a basic feature of the Constitution.[15] Article 324 empowers the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct elections through “superintendence, direction, and control” over the electoral process, including the power to defer or reschedule elections in the event of natural calamities or other exigent circumstances. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner[16] (1978), the Court held that this power under Article 324 must be exercised judiciously and with caution. The proposed Article 82A(5) provides that, where elections to an Assembly cannot be conducted alongside the general elections, the ECI may recommend deferral to the President, who may then order the election to be held at a later date — without specifying fixed grounds on which such a recommendation must be based. This open-ended discretion raises the risk of misuse and could encroach upon state autonomy.

VIII. The Pros and Cons of the 129th Amendment

Pros

Political stability • Lower expenditure • Fewer violations of the Model Code of Conduct • Higher voter turnout • Greater development focus • Streamlined governance • Reduced political corruption

The Union Government has argued that the 129th Amendment, or One Nation One Election, will substantially reduce campaign-related expenditure by removing the need for repeated campaigning. For instance, the cost of the 1951–52 elections was approximately ₹11 crore, while the estimated cost of the 2019 elections was around ₹60,000 crore.[4] Proponents argue that the funds saved could instead be directed toward development and infrastructure. The Bill is also said to improve voter turnout by reducing “election fatigue” — the tendency of voters to disengage from repeated election cycles — and to reduce violations of the Model Code of Conduct, since campaigning would occur only once every five years rather than annually. Supporters further argue that the Bill could reduce political corruption, since the need for campaign funding would arise only once every five years rather than on a near-continuous basis, and could reduce the disruption to governance caused by a near-constant election cycle.

Cons

Overshadowing of national or local issues • Risk of dominance by a single political party • Smaller or regional parties left behind • Greater administrative burden • Constitutional hurdles • Federalism concerns • Reduced democratic responsiveness

Critics caution that simultaneous elections could entrench the dominance of large, well-resourced national parties. A party that performs strongly in the Lok Sabha elections may benefit disproportionately in concurrent State and Local Body elections simply by association, potentially overshadowing smaller or newer parties regardless of their local standing. If sustained over time, this dynamic could risk eroding India’s pluralistic, multi-party democratic character. Beyond this, the Bill faces substantial procedural hurdles: a constitutional amendment of this kind requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament as well as ratification by the states, which is far from straightforward. The framework must also account for the premature dissolution of the Lok Sabha or any State Assembly, and for situations in which the ECI itself determines that elections cannot be held due to emergency or other extraordinary circumstances — either of which could disrupt the simultaneous election cycle the Bill is built around. Given that India operates as a Quasi-Federal structure — ordinarily decentralised, but with power consolidating in the Union Government during emergencies[17] — critics argue that this Bill could shift that balance further toward the Union, raising concerns about the basic structure of the Constitution. Finally, frequent elections allow citizens to revise their political preferences more regularly; a five-year election cycle, by contrast, may reduce the immediacy of democratic accountability between elections.

Conclusion

The 129th Amendment Bill, or “One Nation One Election,” has sparked considerable debate on account of its competing advantages and drawbacks. The more closely one examines the Bill, the more it resists a simple verdict: on one hand, the government frames it as a step toward more efficient governance and greater development; on the other, critics fear it could concentrate excessive power in the central government, raising concerns about a drift toward authoritarianism. The Bill remains highly contested, and reasonable observers differ in their assessments. It may yet prove productive for the country, but in its current form, it is not ready for implementation. The Bill contains genuine constitutional shortcomings that would need to be addressed before it could be safely applied. A more careful balance between Union and State interests may be necessary to make the Bill workable without compromising the basic structure of the Constitution.

References

[1] Kovind Committee, constituted 2 September 2023, chaired by Shri Ram Nath Kovind.
[2] Ministry of Law and Justice, ‘One Nation One Election’ (PIB Delhi, 17 Dec 2024) <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2085082&reg=3&lang=2> accessed 12 May 2026.
[3] Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461.
[4] Anubhuti Vishnoi, ‘One Nation One Election Through the Decades’ The Economic Times (30 Jan 2024).
[5] M.P. Basheer, ‘The Kerala Precedent: How Article 356 Became a Weapon of Cold War Politics’ (The Wire, 19 Aug 2025) <https://thewire.in/history/the-kerala-precedent-how-article-356-became-a-weapon-of-cold-war-politics> accessed 13 May 2026.
[6] ONOE: One Nation One Election.
[7] Constitution of India, enacted 26 January 1950.
[8] Kovind Committee, One Nation One Election (Volume 1, 2024), para 2.
[9] Centre, State, and Local Government.
[10] NCERT.
[11] Dr. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, 1963) 28.
[12] State of Haryana & Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133.
[13] Sarkaria Commission, Report on Centre–State Relations, paras 174–177 (1988).
[14] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.
[15] Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 412.
[16] Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851.
[17] The Quasi-Federal structure denotes a system that is ordinarily federal but shifts toward a unitary structure during emergencies.

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