Weaponizing the Watershed: The Geopolitical Fragility of the Indus Waters Treaty

Abstract

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, brokered by the World Bank, has long been celebrated as one of history’s most resilient water-sharing agreements — surviving three wars and decades of bilateral hostility between India and Pakistan. Yet India’s decision to place the IWT in abeyance following the Pahalgam terrorist attack of April 2025 has exposed a profound geopolitical fragility at the Treaty’s core: that a framework designed to insulate water-sharing from political conflict can itself be weaponised as a diplomatic instrument. This article traces the historical background of the IWT, surveys the major disputes that have tested it, examines its three-tier dispute resolution mechanism, and analyses the constitutional and international dimensions of the current suspension.

I. Introduction

The Indus Waters Treaty was negotiated by the World Bank Group[1] — an intergovernmental organisation comprising five institutions under the United Nations system — to distribute the waters of the Indus River System between India and Pakistan following decades of bilateral dispute. The Treaty was signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 between India, represented by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Pakistan, represented by President Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. It allocates the three eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — exclusively to India, and the three western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab — predominantly to Pakistan.

The Indus River System[2] encompasses numerous tributaries, of which these six rivers are the most consequential for the Treaty’s operation. The IWT has been described as one of the most successful international water-sharing agreements in history, having survived three wars and numerous disputes between the two countries.

The most recent development under the Treaty was India’s decision, on 22 April 2025 — the same day as the Pahalgam attack — to place the IWT in abeyance. As of the date of this article, that suspension has not been lifted.

II. Historical Background

The Indus River originates from a glacier near Bokhar Chu in the Tibetan region, in the Kailash Mountain Range near Mansarovar Lake. The river flows northwest through the Ladakh region of India — entering at Demchok — between the Karakoram and Ladakh ranges, before flowing through Punjab and Sindh and emptying into the Arabian Sea south of Karachi and near Kori Creek in Gujarat. In Tibet, the river is also known as Singi Khamban, or the Lion’s Mouth.

The British partition of 1947, which was drawn on religious rather than geographical lines, severed the Indus River System between the two newly independent states. The river, the largest in Pakistan and one of the largest in Asia, had its headwaters entirely within Indian territory — giving India a geographical advantage. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, unable to obtain agreement from either side on water arrangements, divided the river system without a bilateral framework in place.

In 1951, David Lilienthal published an influential article titled Another Korea in the Making,[3] warning of the escalating water tensions between India and Pakistan and proposing joint development as a solution. Lilienthal is credited as a founding intellectual architect of what became the IWT. His article catalysed nine years of World Bank-mediated negotiations, culminating in the Treaty’s signature on 19 September 1960.

III. Structure of the Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960[4] consists of 12 Articles and 8 Annexures (A to H), which together constitute the complete operational framework of the Treaty.

Articles of the Treaty:
Article 1 – Definitions
Article 2 – Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers
Article 3 – Provisions Regarding Western Rivers
Article 4 – Provisions Regarding Eastern and Western Rivers
Article 5 – Financial Provisions
Article 6 – Exchange of Data
Article 7 – Future Co-operation
Article 8 – Permanent Indus Commission
Article 9 – Settlement of Disputes and Differences
Article 10 – Emergency Provisions
Article 11 – General Provisions
Article 12 – Final Provisions

Annexures of the Treaty:
Annexure A – Exchange of Notes
Annexure B – Agricultural Use by Pakistan (Eastern Rivers)
Annexure C – Agricultural Use by India (Western Rivers)
Annexure D – Generation of Hydroelectric Power (Western Rivers)
Annexure E – Storage of Waters by India (Western Rivers)
Annexure F – Neutral Expert
Annexure G – Court of Arbitration
Annexure H – Transitional Arrangements

IV. Major Disputes Under the Indus Waters Treaty

The India–Pakistan Water Dispute of 1948[5]
The first weaponisation of the Indus river system occurred in April 1948, shortly after independence. East Punjab (India) cut off the supply of water to West Punjab (Pakistan) through the main branches of the Dipalpur Canal from the Ferozepur Headworks. The supply was resumed after five weeks, following Pakistan’s agreement to attend an Inter-Dominion conference for negotiation. The engineers of East and West Punjab had signed a standstill agreement from December 1947 to March 1948 covering the Rabi crop season. When West Punjab declined to renew the agreement, India cut off the supply — marking the first recorded instance of the Indus system being used as a political weapon. In May 1948, an Inter-Dominion Accord was signed requiring India to provide water to Pakistan’s water basin in return for annual payments.

Tulbul Navigation Barrage Project — Jhelum River[6]
The Tulbul Navigation Project is a proposed navigation lock-cum-control structure at the outflow of Wular Lake on the Jhelum River, designed to regulate water flow for navigation. Proposed in the early 1980s and commenced in 1984, construction was halted due to Pakistan’s sustained objection that the project violated the IWT. The project remained stalled for four decades. Following India’s suspension of the IWT in 2025, efforts have been made to revive it.

Baglihar Dam Dispute — Chenab River[7]
The Baglihar Dam (also known as the Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project) is a run-of-the-river project on the Chenab River in Ramban District, Jammu and Kashmir. Proposed in 1992 and approved in 1996, construction began in 1999. Pakistan objected, arguing the design parameters violated the IWT and that the project gave India disproportionate control over water flows during periods of political tension. Bilateral talks from 1999 to 2004 produced no resolution. On 18 January 2005, Pakistan referred the matter to the World Bank as a “difference” under the IWT, resulting in the appointment of a Neutral Expert. The Neutral Expert upheld some minor objections but rejected Pakistan’s principal claims.

Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project — Jhelum River[8]
India commenced the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Plant on the Kishanganga River (known as the Neelum in Pakistan) in 2007, aiming to divert the river through an underground tunnel to a powerhouse near Bonar Nallah in India-administered Kashmir. Pakistan raised objections in 2006, before construction began, on grounds of treaty non-compliance. The matter was escalated to the Court of Arbitration, which in 2013 permitted India to proceed with the diversion but required it to maintain a minimum flow of 9 cubic metres per second (cumecs).

Ratle Hydroelectric Plant — Chenab River[9]
The Ratle Hydroelectric Power Project is a run-of-the-river project on the Chenab River, currently under construction. Pakistan objected in 2016. In 2017, Pakistan requested the matter be referred to the Court of Arbitration, while India preferred resolution by a Neutral Expert. As of the date of this article, the Court of Arbitration proceedings remain ongoing with no final award issued.

The Pahalgam Attack and Treaty Suspension[10]
On 22 April 2025, The Resistance Front (TRF) carried out a terrorist attack in the Anantnag District of Jammu and Kashmir, killing 24 to 26 tourists. The attack prompted Prime Minister Modi to convene an emergency Cabinet Committee on Security, curtailing his visit to Saudi Arabia. Among the decisions taken was the immediate suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. India formally placed the IWT in abeyance — marking the first time in the Treaty’s sixty-five-year history that either party had taken this step. Despite multiple diplomatic communications from Pakistan, the suspension remains in effect.

V. Dispute Resolution Mechanism Under the Indus Waters Treaty

Article IX of the IWT[4] provides a three-tier escalation framework for resolving disagreements.

Tier 1 — Permanent Indus Commission[11]
Both parties must notify each other of planned projects on the Indus rivers. The Permanent Indus Commission is the primary body responsible for managing and overseeing Treaty objectives and serves as the first forum for bilateral discussion of disagreements. If it fails to resolve the matter, the issue escalates to the next tier.

Tier 2 — Neutral Expert[12]
Where the Permanent Indus Commission cannot resolve a “difference,” the World Bank appoints a Neutral Expert to conduct technical assessments and make recommendations. The Neutral Expert’s decision is binding only if both parties accept it. Failure to resolve the matter at this tier triggers escalation to the third and final level.

Tier 3 — Court of Arbitration[13]
A “dispute” (as technically distinguished from a “difference”) that cannot be resolved by the Neutral Expert is referred to the Court of Arbitration, whose Chair is appointed by the World Bank. The Court of Arbitration’s decisions are final and binding on both parties.

VI. Conclusion

The Indus Waters Treaty has proven remarkably durable, surviving conflicts and crises that would have shattered lesser international frameworks. Yet India’s decision to place it in abeyance reveals a fragility that the Treaty’s architects may not have fully anticipated: the Treaty contains no explicit provision for unilateral suspension, and the legitimacy of India’s action under international law remains deeply contested.

The Indian Constitution guarantees the Right to Life under Article 21,[14] and the Supreme Court has interpreted this right to encompass the right to a clean and healthy environment.[15] Water, as the most elemental natural resource, falls at the heart of that right. Using it as a diplomatic weapon — even in response to an unconscionable act of terrorism — raises profound questions about the proportionality of the response, India’s obligations under the IWT and customary international law, and the signal sent to the broader international community about the durability of treaty commitments.

The IWT may yet endure this crisis. But the current suspension serves as a stark reminder that even the most resilient international frameworks are ultimately dependent on the political will of the states that created them. Whether India and Pakistan can find a path back to treaty compliance — and whether the IWT’s dispute resolution mechanisms can function in the absence of that political will — will define the next chapter of one of international law’s most closely watched bilateral agreements.

References

[1] World Bank Group, The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank, World Bank (2022), https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank
[2] NextIAS, Indus River System, https://www.nextias.com/blog/indus-river-system/.
[3] David E. Lilienthal, Another Korea in the Making, Collier’s Weekly (Aug. 4, 1951), discussed in Undala Z. Alam, Water Rationality: Mediating the Indus Waters Treaty, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wwp2.12035
[4] Indus Waters Treaty, India–Pakistan, Sept. 19, 1960, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6439/Indus.
[5] India–Pakistan Water Dispute of 1948, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Pakistan_water_dispute_of_1948.
[6] India Revives Tulbul Project in Big Push to Reclaim Water Rights Under Indus Waters Treaty, Economic Times (2025), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-revives-tulbul-project.
[7] Baglihar Dam, Drishti IAS, https://www.drishtiias.com/state-pcs-current-affairs/baglihar-dam.
[8] Climate Diplomacy, Conflicts Surrounding the Kishanganga Dam, https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/conflicts-surrounding-kishanganga-dam.
[9] Ratle Hydroelectric Plant, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratle_Hydroelectric_Plant.
[10] Chatham House, India and Pakistan Still Cannot Agree to Restore Indus Waters Treaty — Re-engagement Could Help (Apr. 2026), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/04/india-and-pakistan-still-cannot-agree-restore-indus-waters-treaty-re-engagement-could-help.
[11] Indus Waters Treaty, art. 8, supra note 4.
[12] Indus Waters Treaty, Annexure F, supra note 4.
[13] Indus Waters Treaty, Annexure G, supra note 4.
[14] India Const. art. 21.
[15] Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 652.