Published On: 21st January, 2025
Authored By: Banshika Gupta
DAVV University, Indore (M.P.)
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 2nd March, 2023.
PETITIONER: Anoop Baranwal
RESPONDENT: Union of India
BENCH: Honourable Justices K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy, C.T. Ravikumar
CITATION: W.P.(C) 114/2015
Case Overview
- The case of Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India deals with the procedure for selecting and appointing Election Commissioners and the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) of India.
- A writ petition filed by Anoop Baranwal challenged the existing appointment system, claiming it violated Article 324(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner argued for a collegium-like system to oversee the selection of members of the Election Commission of India (ECI).
- Article 324(2) governs the composition of the Election Commission and outlines the method for appointing its members. Historically, the President has appointed members based on the Prime Minister’s recommendations. The provision also envisages that Parliament would enact a law to prescribe the process of appointment. However, despite the passage of nearly seven decades, Parliament has not enacted such legislation.
- The petition contended that the absence of a dedicated law undermines the independence of the Election Commission, leaving it susceptible to executive influence. The petitioner requested the Supreme Court to direct Parliament to either formulate a law governing the appointment process or establish a mechanism to ensure the neutrality and transparency of the Election Commission.
- A five-judge constitutional bench, comprising Justices K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy, and C.T. Ravikumar, considered two primary issues:
I. Does the current appointment procedure for ECI members violate constitutional principles?
II. Would judicial intervention in the appointment process undermine the separation of powers?
- On March 2, 2023, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, unanimously ruling that the appointment of Election Commissioners, including the Chief Election Commissioner, should be conducted by a three-member committee. This committee consists of the Chief Justice of India, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition.
- The Court emphasized the importance of safeguarding the Election Commission’s independence from executive interference. It criticized Parliament’s failure to enact legislation ensuring the Commission’s autonomy and highlighted the judiciary’s role in bridging constitutional gaps until Parliament fulfills the framers’ intent by passing the necessary law.
Contentions by the Parties
The Petitioners contended:
- The absence of a law specifying the eligibility criteria for the appointment of an Election Commissioner has created a legal void. Judicial intervention is essential to address this gap, as free and fair elections form the bedrock of democracy. A democracy can only function effectively when elections are conducted by an independent and impartial body.
- The Supreme Court has previously stepped in with reformative judgments on electoral issues, such as the trial of MPs/MLAs, the declaration of assets, the introduction of NOTA, and measures to prevent booth capturing.
- Advocate Prashant Bhushan argued that the existing appointment mechanism for Election Commissioners is inconsistent with Article 324(2) of the Constitution and violates Article 14 due to its arbitrary nature. The right to vote, a constitutional right, is compromised when elections are not conducted by a neutral and independent Election Commission.
- The Election Commission holds significant quasi-judicial powers, including resolving disputes between political parties, registering political parties, allotting symbols, and enforcing the moral code of conduct. Often, the ruling government is a party to these disputes. Allowing the executive sole authority over appointments risks bias in the Commission’s decisions. Petitioners referred to Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record and Another v. Union of India to strengthen their argument.
- References were made to Justice Madan Lokur’s report, which highlights the Election Commission’s inconsistencies in implementing the moral code of conduct, and the 255th Law Commission Report, which proposed several electoral reforms, including appointing Election Commissioners through a three-member committee’s recommendations.
- There has been a noticeable trend of appointing older candidates as Election Commissioners, reducing their tenure. The independence of the Election Commission is closely tied to its appointment process. Most Commissioners have been ex-bureaucrats, and appointments made solely by the executive render the Commission partisan and an extension of the executive branch.
- The petitioners advocated for the establishment of a collegium-like committee to recommend appointments to the Election Commission. They also proposed that Election Commissioners receive the same constitutional protections as the Chief Election Commissioner under Article 324(5) to uphold the institution’s independence and integrity.
The Respondents contended:
- The Learned Attorney General of India opposed the assertion that there exists a legal vacuum in the appointment of Election Commissioners, arguing that the Constitution already provides a framework for these appointments. It was stated that Article 324(2) does not impose a constitutional obligation on Parliament to enact specific legislation for this purpose.
- The respondent highlighted the principle of judicial restraint in matters concerning legislative functions. Judicial intervention in this domain, it was argued, would contravene the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court should establish guidelines only in cases where a fundamental right is at stake, while matters of policy should remain beyond judicial scrutiny.
- It was further contended that the proposal to constitute a committee for recommending appointments to the Election Commission contradicts the process laid out in Article 74, which mandates that the President act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Relying on the judgment in T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, the respondent reaffirmed that the President is the constitutional authority responsible for these appointments.
- Additionally, the Government also defended its practice of appointing members from the civil services, arguing that individuals from this background are best suited for the role of Election Commissioners.
Rationale behind Judgement
- After considering evidence from both sides, the bench delivered its decision by evaluating several key factors, including the rule of law, the potential for manipulation, impartiality, fairness, and public confidence.
- In a unanimous ruling, the five-judge bench declared the existing method of appointing members to the Election Commission as unconstitutional. The bench held that the current system violated the principles of free and fair elections as well as the right to equality. To safeguard the Commission’s independence, the Court mandated a revision of the appointment process.
- The Supreme Court ruled that the President of India appoint the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners based on recommendations made by a committee comprising:
- The Prime Minister of India,
- The Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and
- The Chief Justice of India.
- In cases where the Leader of the Opposition is unavailable, the Leader of the largest party in the Opposition in the Lok Sabha will serve on the committee. This arrangement, the Court ordered, will remain in place until Parliament enacts the necessary legislation.
- Referencing landmark cases such as the Third Judges Case and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, the Court emphasized its duty to address gaps in public welfare. It underscored that the electoral system is fundamental to democracy, forming part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Without free and fair elections conducted by an impartial Election Commission, democracy cannot function effectively.
- This ruling represents a significant step toward ensuring the Commission’s independence by shielding it from executive interference. By addressing legislative inaction, the Supreme Court has adopted an activist role. However, it stressed the importance of maintaining the delicate balance between the separation of powers. Judicial activism must not evolve into judicial overreach, as it risks undermining the Constitution’s core principles. Through restraint and by fostering equality among the branches of government, the judiciary ensures its own stability while contributing to the democratic process.
Defects of Law
The judgment reflects an unwarranted intrusion into the legislative domain. The framers of the Constitution vested the power to legislate on Election Commission (EC) appointments in the Parliament, as it is the elected representative body of the people of India. The courts do not possess the authority to create guidelines to compensate for legislative inaction. In this instance, the court has overstepped its boundaries, interfering with the law-making function, which is the prerogative of the legislature. This violates the principle of separation of powers.
Inference
Elections are fundamental to a democracy and form part of the Constitution’s basic structure. The smooth functioning of a democracy depends on free and fair elections conducted by a neutral and impartial Election Commission. This judgment is a step toward safeguarding the independence of the Commission, ensuring it remains insulated from executive interference. For the first time, the Supreme Court has established norms regarding a constitutional provision.
The Supreme Court Is playing an activist role by addressing gaps left by legislative inaction. However, it is crucial to maintain the delicate balance of separation of powers. Judicial activism should not evolve into judicial overreach, as it conflicts with the Constitution’s principles. A restrained judiciary upholds stability by fostering equality between branches of government.
References
[1] INDIA CONST. art. 324, cl. 2.
[2] Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India WP© 104/2015
[3] Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record and anr. V. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1
[4] Madan Lokur, Wajahat Habibullah, et.al. Citizens’ Commission on Elections’ Report on EVMs and VVPAT 2022 Economic & Political Weekly (last visited 20th September, 2023) https://www.epw.in/journal/2022/3/perspectives/citizens%E2%80%99-commission-elections%E2%80%99-report-evms-and.html
[5] Law Commission of India, Strengthening the Office of the Election Commission of India Report No. 255, 2015 https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2022/08/2022081635.p d
[6] INDIA CONST. art. 324, cl. 5.
[7] INDIA CONST. art. 74.
[8] T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner of India v. Union of India and ors, (1995) 4 SCC 611
[9] INDIA CONST. art. 142.
[10] Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241
[11] Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, Re (1998) 7 SCC 739
[12] Background Paper on Electoral Reform, Ministry of Law & Justice (2010), 6.3 Measures for Election Commission, at pg. 19 https://lawmin.gov.in/background-paper-electoral-reforms
[13] People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399
[14] INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1(a).