Published On: August 23, 2026
Authored By: Kalpita Krishnakumar
Woxsen University
Case Details
Case Name and Citation:
Pragya Prasun and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 289 of 2024[1]
with
Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 49 of 2025[2]
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala & Justice R. Mahadevan
Date of Judgment: 30 April 2025
I. Factual Matrix
This case combines two writ petitions that address similar issues. In the first petition, W.P.(C) No. 289 of 2024, the petitioners were a group of acid attack survivors, led by Pragya Prasun, who suffered permanent facial disfigurement and severe eye burns as a result of the attacks on them. The petitioner in the connected matter, W.P.(C) No. 49 of 2025, Amar Jain, is a practising advocate who is completely blind. Both petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, invoking the Supreme Court’s writ jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights.
The issue common to both matters concerned the Digital KYC (“Know Your Customer”), e-KYC, and Video-KYC processes mandated by various financial and telecom regulators to verify customer identity before providing services such as opening a bank account, obtaining a SIM card, or accessing insurance and pension products. As part of the digital verification protocol, most service providers require customers to record a “live photograph,” involving tests such as blinking the eyes or following on-screen facial prompts.
For the acid attack survivor petitioners, physical damage to their eyes and eyelids made it impossible to perform the required blinking action, while their facial disfigurement was frequently not recognised by facial-recognition software calibrated for “typical” facial features. For Amar Jain, complete blindness meant he could not see or follow visual on-screen instructions guiding him to align his face with the camera, and no audio-based alternative was provided. As a result, both sets of petitioners were unable to independently complete e-KYC formalities and were compelled to seek help from third parties—an outcome that compromised their autonomy and dignity and effectively denied them access to essential services such as banking, telecom connections, insurance, and pension enrolment.
The petitioners approached the relevant regulatory authorities but found the existing framework silent on accessible alternatives. They accordingly sought directions from the Supreme Court compelling these bodies to frame appropriate rules ensuring that the KYC process is inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities, particularly those with visual impairment and facial disfigurement, in line with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (“RPwD Act”) and Article 21 of the Constitution.[3]
II. Issues Before the Court
1. Whether the existing Digital KYC/e-KYC/Video-KYC framework, by mandating visually dependent liveliness checks such as blinking, violates the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities under Article 21 of the Constitution.
2. Whether such requirements amount to indirect discrimination against persons with facial disfigurement and blindness, contrary to the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination.
3. Whether regulators such as the RBI, SEBI, DoT, PFRDA, and IRDAI are under a statutory obligation to provide “reasonable accommodation” under the RPwD Act[4] and the RPwD Rules, 2017,[5] and whether digital accessibility forms part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21.
4. What specific directions, if any, are necessary to render digital public and financial services genuinely accessible to persons with disabilities.
III. The Battle of Contentions
A. Petitioners’ Contentions
The petitioners argued that the digital KYC architecture, as currently designed, was inherently exclusionary and discriminatory, locking persons with certain disabilities out of essential services. Specifically, they contended:
• The “live photograph” requirement involving blinking or dynamic facial movement burdens acid attack survivors and blind persons, since the technology assumes a body capable of performing actions that many disabled persons physically cannot.
• This design failure amounts to indirect discrimination and a violation of the right to equality, dignity, and bodily autonomy protected under Article 21.
• Article 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which India has ratified, obliges the State to ensure accessibility to information and communication technologies, including the internet, for persons with disabilities.[6] The current KYC regime fails to honour this obligation.
B. Respondents’ Contentions
Each regulator filed separate responses, largely resisting the characterisation of the KYC framework as discriminatory while pointing to existing flexibilities:
• RBI submitted that KYC norms flow from the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and that it lacks authority to unilaterally override that statutory scheme. It maintained that the “blinking” test was not, in fact, mandatory under its Digital KYC guidelines.
• TRAI disclaimed responsibility, stating that KYC formulation and implementation for telecom subscribers falls within the domain of the DoT, not TRAI.
• DoT stated that KYC verification is essential for subscriber identification on security grounds but noted that it had already issued recommendations, dated 9 July 2018, on making ICT services accessible to persons with disabilities, and that the eye-blinking mechanism was not compulsory.
• SEBI argued that digital KYC is merely an additional convenience and not the sole route; physical KYC using thumb impressions, or a guardian’s signature where necessary, remains available to persons with visual impairment.
• PFRDA contended that blinking is only one of several possible liveliness-check methods.
• IRDAI stated that digital KYC is optional, that its framework already allows signature, thumb impression, or OTP-based authentication, and that disabled persons may nominate another individual to make declarations on their behalf.
In essence, the respondents’ common position was that digital KYC was not mandatory in an absolute sense and that offline or alternative options already technically existed, even if these were not adequately publicised, standardised, or genuinely accessible in practice.
IV. The Verdict
The Court held that accessibility to digital public services is integral to the right to life and dignity under Article 21, relying on its own precedent in Rajive Raturi v. Union of India,[7] which recognised access to information, technology, and digital platforms as a facet of Article 21, and on the ruling concerning recruitment of visually impaired persons in judicial services, which described the RPwD Act as a “super-statute” capable of overriding inconsistent provisions in other laws. The Court also drew on Disabled Rights Group v. Union of India to emphasise the constitutional imperative of removing barriers to participation for persons with disabilities.[8]
Adopting what is often called the “social model of disability,” the Court reasoned that the exclusion faced by the petitioners stemmed not from their disabilities as such, but from the poor design of KYC systems that failed to accommodate diverse human capabilities. It held that merely making an alternative “theoretically” available, such as offline KYC, was insufficient if, in practice, persons with disabilities could not access it independently and with dignity. The Court accordingly issued a comprehensive set of twenty directions requiring regulators to mandate OTP-based or alternative liveliness verification, requiring compliance with the Guidelines for Indian Government Websites (GIGW), involving persons with disabilities in accessibility audits and app/website testing, setting up dedicated grievance redressal mechanisms, and conducting disability-sensitisation training for staff.
V. Critical Analysis of the Verdict
This judgment is significant for treating digital accessibility not as a matter of policy discretion but as an enforceable constitutional entitlement flowing from Article 21. Its importance is heightened by its recognition of the right to digital access as part of Article 21.
In an era of rapid technological growth, systems that fail to account for diverse abilities create exclusion for entire groups, cutting them off from essential benefits and undermining their rights to privacy, dignity, and equal access to technology. Such exclusion also risks reinforcing the perception among affected persons that they are different and undeserving.
Although the Supreme Court has now mandated that every portal and website provide inclusive alternatives, implementation will take considerable time. Whether the judgment remains confined to paper or translates into real change will depend on how effectively this decision reshapes practice on the ground.
Access to technology, and the benefits that flow from it, should never be contingent on discrimination among citizens. Every individual is equal before the law, and as technology advances, it must serve to narrow inequality rather than widen it—helping every individual grow equally.
This case illustrates the real harm caused by poorly designed verification mechanisms, and underscores the need for change going forward. As a country, the focus must remain on uplifting every individual to achieve a genuine and inclusive sense of development.
References
[1] Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 599 (India).
[2] Amar Jain v. Union of India, W.P. (Civil) No. 49 of 2025, 2025 INSC 599 (India).
[3] India Const. art. 21.
[4] Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, No. 49 of 2016, India Code (2016).
[5] Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017, Gazette of India, pt. II, sec. 3(i) (June 15, 2017) (India).
[6] Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 9, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
[7] Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, (2018) 2 S.C.C. 413 (India).
[8] Disabled Rights Grp. v. Union of India, (2018) 2 S.C.C. 397 (India).
