Case Summary: Supriyo Chakraborty & Anr v Union of India (2023)

 

Case Details

Case Name: Supriyo Chakraborty & Anr v Union of India
Citation: Supriyo Chakraborty & Anr v Union of India, (2023) 16 SCC 1
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice S. Ravindra Bhatt, Justice Hima Kohli, and Justice P.S. Narasimha (Constitution Bench)
Date of Judgment: 17 October 2023

Introduction

The decision in Supriyo Chakraborty v Union of India (2023) represents one of the most constitutionally significant rulings delivered by the Supreme Court after Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India. The Constitution Bench was called upon to determine whether the Constitution mandates recognition of marriages between same-sex and queer couples under existing marriage statutes. The judgment tested the limits of constitutional interpretation, separation of powers, equality jurisprudence, and the relationship between individual rights and legislative policy.

While the Court unanimously acknowledged that LGBTQIA+ persons possess equal dignity and enjoy constitutional protection under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21, the Bench declined to judicially recognise a fundamental right to marry under existing statutory schemes. The judgment therefore stands at the intersection of constitutional morality and institutional restraint, affirming substantive equality while refusing to rewrite family law through judicial interpretation.

Facts of the Case

Following the landmark ruling in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, consensual same-sex relationships ceased to constitute criminal offences under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. However, despite decriminalisation, same-sex couples continued to remain excluded from the legal institution of marriage and the numerous rights attached to it.

Several same-sex couples, queer individuals, and LGBTQIA+ organisations approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The lead petition was filed by Supriyo Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, who had been in a committed relationship for several years but were unable to solemnise their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (SMA).

The petitioners argued that although the SMA was enacted as a secular law permitting civil marriages irrespective of religion, its language consistently employed gender-specific expressions such as “husband,” “wife,” “male,” and “female.” Consequently, marriage officers across the country refused to register marriages between same-sex couples.

The challenge soon expanded beyond the Special Marriage Act. Various petitions questioned provisions contained in the:

• Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
• Foreign Marriage Act, 1969
• Citizenship Act, 1955
• Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
• Adoption regulations and several connected statutes that extended marital benefits only to heterosexual spouses

The petitioners emphasised that exclusion from marriage deprived queer couples of numerous legal incidents, including:

• inheritance rights
• succession
• pension and gratuity benefits
• medical decision-making authority
• insurance nominations
• taxation benefits
• joint bank accounts
• adoption rights
• next-of-kin status
• immigration benefits
• recognition of family life

Thus, although LGBTQIA+ persons had obtained constitutional recognition of their identities in earlier decisions such as National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and Navtej Singh Johar, the absence of legal recognition of their relationships continued to produce systemic discrimination.

Recognising the constitutional importance of these issues, the Chief Justice constituted a five-judge Constitution Bench to determine whether existing marriage laws violated the guarantees of equality, liberty, and dignity.

Legal Issues

The Constitution Bench framed several interrelated constitutional questions, the principal issues being:

1. Whether the Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to marry irrespective of sexual orientation.
The Court had to determine whether Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21, read together, required the State to recognise marriages between same-sex couples.

2. Whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from the Special Marriage Act, 1954 violates Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
The petitioners argued that the Act was unconstitutional because it discriminated solely on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.

3. Whether the Supreme Court could read gender-neutral expressions into the Special Marriage Act through constitutional interpretation.
An important institutional question arose regarding the limits of judicial interpretation. Could the Court substitute expressions such as “husband” and “wife” with gender-neutral terms like “spouse,” or would such an exercise amount to judicial legislation?

4. Whether queer couples possess a constitutional right to form legally recognised families.
The Court also examined whether constitutional guarantees protecting autonomy, dignity, and privacy necessarily include recognition of non-traditional family structures.

5. Whether unmarried queer couples are entitled to protection against discrimination by the State.
The petitions highlighted numerous governmental practices that disadvantaged queer couples in areas such as employment, housing, healthcare, and welfare.

These questions required the Court to reconcile constitutional morality with democratic legitimacy, while determining the extent to which courts may intervene in legislative policy concerning family law.

Arguments of the Petitioners

The petitioners contended that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage amounted to unconstitutional discrimination. They argued that the Constitution protects not merely the right to exist as LGBTQIA+ persons but also the right to build families, enter into committed relationships, and receive equal legal recognition for those relationships. According to them, the denial of marriage reduced the guarantees recognised in earlier constitutional decisions to symbolic rather than substantive rights.

1. Violation of Article 14: Equality Before Law
The petitioners submitted that the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (SMA) creates an arbitrary classification by permitting only heterosexual couples to marry. They argued that the object of the Act is to facilitate civil marriage irrespective of religion or caste. Excluding couples solely because both partners are of the same sex bears no rational nexus to that objective.

Relying upon Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, they argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation is constitutionally impermissible and that equality under Article 14 requires equal access to legal institutions that confer civil status and legal benefits.

The petitioners further submitted that constitutional equality extends beyond formal equality. It requires the State to dismantle structural barriers that deny equal participation in social institutions. Marriage, they argued, is one such institution from which LGBTQIA+ persons continue to be excluded.

2. Violation of Articles 15 and 21
The petitioners argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of discrimination “on the ground of sex” prohibited by Article 15. They relied upon the Supreme Court’s progressive interpretation of Article 15 in Navtej Singh Johar, where the Court recognised that constitutional protection against sex discrimination includes discrimination rooted in sexual orientation and gender identity.

Under Article 21, they argued that the right to life encompasses dignity, privacy, decisional autonomy, and the freedom to choose one’s life partner. Marriage is a deeply personal decision that lies at the core of individual liberty. Denying same-sex couples access to marriage deprives them of equal dignity and prevents them from enjoying the legal and social recognition available to heterosexual couples.

The petitioners relied heavily upon Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India, where privacy was recognised as including decisional autonomy concerning intimate relationships.

3. Right to Form a Family
Another central submission was that constitutional rights do not end with decriminalisation of same-sex intimacy. The petitioners argued that LGBTQIA+ persons possess the same aspirations to establish stable family units as heterosexual couples.

They emphasised that international human rights jurisprudence increasingly recognises diverse family structures. Family, they argued, cannot be confined to biological or heterosexual models. Rather, constitutional morality requires recognition of relationships founded upon mutual commitment, affection, and shared responsibility.

They further contended that exclusion from marriage deprives queer couples of numerous incidental rights, including:

• succession and inheritance
• maintenance
• pension and gratuity
• health-care decision-making
• insurance and nomination benefits
• joint adoption and guardianship
• tax and employment benefits
• recognition as legal next of kin

Consequently, the denial of marriage was not merely symbolic but had serious practical consequences affecting everyday life.

4. Reading the Special Marriage Act in a Gender-Neutral Manner
Instead of striking down the SMA, the petitioners proposed that the Court should interpret it in a constitutionally compliant manner.

They argued that expressions such as “husband,” “wife,” “male,” and “female” could be read as “spouse” or “person.” Such an interpretative exercise, they contended, would preserve the statute while eliminating unconstitutional discrimination.

According to the petitioners, constitutional courts have repeatedly adopted purposive interpretations to preserve legislation. Reading gender-neutral terminology into the SMA would therefore amount to constitutional interpretation rather than judicial legislation.

5. Constitutional Morality over Social Morality
The petitioners argued that constitutional rights cannot depend upon majoritarian social acceptance. They relied upon observations in Navtej Singh Johar and Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala, 2018, where the Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional morality prevails over prevailing social prejudices.

They submitted that the Court has historically protected vulnerable minorities even where legislative reform lagged behind constitutional values. Consequently, judicial recognition of marriage equality would be consistent with the Court’s role as the guardian of fundamental rights.

Arguments of the Union of India

The Union of India opposed the petitions, maintaining that the Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to marry a person of one’s choice irrespective of the statutory framework. It argued that marriage is fundamentally a legislative institution regulated by Parliament and that any alteration to its scope lies within the democratic domain.

1. Marriage is a Statutory Institution
The Union contended that although individuals possess autonomy in choosing their partners, the legal recognition of marriage is governed by statutes enacted by Parliament. Marriage is not merely a private relationship but a legal status carrying numerous rights and obligations affecting succession, adoption, taxation, inheritance, pensions, and family law.

Since these rights arise through legislation rather than directly from the Constitution, Parliament alone possesses the authority to redefine marriage.

2. Judicial Interpretation Cannot Rewrite Legislation
The Government argued that replacing expressions such as “husband” and “wife” with gender-neutral terminology would fundamentally alter the legislative scheme of the SMA.

Such changes would have cascading consequences across multiple statutes governing:

• adoption
• guardianship
• succession
• inheritance
• maintenance
• surrogacy
• assisted reproductive technologies
• taxation

Accordingly, any judicial rewriting of the Act would amount to legislation, thereby violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

3. Legislative Intent
The Union submitted that the Special Marriage Act was enacted to provide a secular avenue for marriage between a biological male and a biological female belonging to different religions or communities. Parliament never intended the Act to regulate same-sex unions.

Reading gender-neutral expressions into the statute would therefore defeat the legislative intent underlying the enactment.

4. No Fundamental Right to Marry
The respondents argued that previous Supreme Court decisions recognising the right to choose one’s spouse—such as Shafin Jahan v Asokan K.M, 2018 and Shakti Vahini v Union of India, 2018—protected the freedom to enter into marriages that were otherwise valid under existing law. Those judgments, they argued, did not establish an independent constitutional right requiring the State to create new forms of marriage.

Therefore, while LGBTQIA+ persons undoubtedly enjoy equal constitutional protection, equality does not compel Parliament to redesign the institution of marriage.

5. Social Policy Requires Democratic Deliberation
The Union further submitted that recognising same-sex marriage would have significant consequences extending beyond marriage law into family law, personal laws, adoption, succession, and welfare legislation.

Such complex policy choices require broad democratic consultation involving Parliament and the States. Courts, it argued, should refrain from entering this legislative field, particularly where multiple statutes would require coordinated amendment.

Observations During the Hearing

During the extensive hearings, members of the Constitution Bench acknowledged that LGBTQIA+ persons are entitled to equal dignity and constitutional protection. However, substantial judicial attention also focused on the institutional limits of constitutional adjudication.

The Bench repeatedly examined whether constitutional interpretation could legitimately transform an entire statutory framework or whether doing so would exceed the judicial function. This tension between constitutional rights and separation of powers ultimately became central to the final judgment.

Judgment

On 17 October 2023, the Constitution Bench delivered a split verdict (3:2) declining to recognise a constitutional right to same-sex marriage under existing Indian law. While all five judges unequivocally affirmed that LGBTQIA+ persons are entitled to equal constitutional protection and dignity, the majority held that it was beyond the judicial function to redefine the statutory institution of marriage.

The majority opinion was authored principally by Justice S. Ravindra Bhatt (for himself, Justice Hima Kohli, and Justice P.S. Narasimha). Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, writing for himself and Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, delivered a separate minority opinion advocating greater constitutional protection for queer relationships, though even he stopped short of reading same-sex marriage into the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

The Court unanimously reaffirmed that sexual orientation is an intrinsic aspect of identity and that discrimination against LGBTQIA+ persons violates constitutional guarantees. The Bench reiterated that constitutional rights recognised in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India continue to protect queer persons from discrimination in public and private life.

However, the majority concluded that the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is a carefully structured legislative scheme designed around heterosexual marriage. Reading gender-neutral terminology into the Act would require extensive modification of numerous interconnected provisions relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, succession, adoption, prohibited relationships, and legitimacy of children. Such an exercise, the majority held, would amount to judicial legislation, which lies beyond the constitutional role of the judiciary.

Justice Bhatt observed that although courts possess the authority to interpret statutes consistently with constitutional values, they cannot substitute legislative policy with judicial preferences merely because another model appears constitutionally desirable.

The majority therefore rejected the prayer to reinterpret expressions such as “husband,” “wife,” “male,” and “female” as gender-neutral terms.

Civil Union Question

An important point of divergence emerged regarding civil unions.

Chief Justice Chandrachud held that queer couples possess a constitutional right to enter into enduring relationships deserving legal recognition. According to him, Article 21 protects not merely intimate association but also the right to establish a family of one’s choice. Although he accepted that marriage itself could not be judicially created, he proposed that the Union Government establish a framework recognising civil unions so that same-sex couples could receive at least certain legal protections.

The majority rejected even this proposition, holding that creation of a distinct legal institution equivalent to civil unions would itself involve substantial legislative policy choices reserved for Parliament.

Adoption Rights

Another significant issue concerned adoption by queer couples.

The petitioners challenged Regulation 5(3) of the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) Adoption Regulations, 2022, which effectively prevented unmarried same-sex couples from jointly adopting children.

Chief Justice Chandrachud held that the regulation unjustifiably discriminated against queer couples. He reasoned that there was no empirical evidence establishing that same-sex parents are inherently less capable of providing stable and nurturing homes for children.

The majority, however, disagreed. Justice Bhatt held that adoption policy involves complex assessments of child welfare and legislative judgment. Consequently, the challenge to the CARA Regulation failed.

Directions Issued by the Court

Although refusing marriage equality, the Court nevertheless issued important directions aimed at protecting LGBTQIA+ persons.

The Court recognised that:

• queer persons have an equal right to choose their life partners
• discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unconstitutional
• the State must ensure that LGBTQIA+ persons are not subjected to violence or coercive treatment because of their identities
• police authorities must sensitise officers dealing with queer individuals
• families cannot forcibly separate consenting adult partners
• governments should examine administrative measures to eliminate discrimination in healthcare, employment, education, and access to public services

The Court also suggested that the Union Government constitute a committee to examine practical measures for addressing hardships faced by queer couples in everyday life.

Ratio Decidendi

The prominent legal principles emerging from the majority decision may be summarised as follows:

First, the Constitution protects LGBTQIA+ persons as equal citizens entitled to dignity, privacy, autonomy, and non-discrimination under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21.

Secondly, there is no independent fundamental right to marry that obliges the State to create or recognise every form of marriage. Marriage remains a legal status primarily governed by statutory law.

Thirdly, constitutional courts may interpret legislation consistently with constitutional values but cannot substantially rewrite statutory schemes in a manner that fundamentally alters legislative policy.

Fourthly, recognition of same-sex marriage requires comprehensive legislative reform rather than judicial interpretation because marriage law intersects with numerous statutory regimes governing family relationships.

Accordingly, the majority held that the appropriate constitutional forum for introducing marriage equality is Parliament, not the judiciary.

Critical Analysis

The judgment is among the most debated constitutional decisions in contemporary Indian jurisprudence because it simultaneously advances and limits LGBTQIA+ rights.

One of its greatest strengths lies in its unequivocal affirmation that queer persons enjoy equal constitutional dignity. The Court firmly rejected the notion that heterosexual relationships possess any superior constitutional value. This continues the transformative constitutional vision articulated in NALSA, Puttaswamy, and Navtej Singh Johar.

The judgment also reflects institutional caution. The majority’s concern regarding separation of powers is doctrinally persuasive. The Special Marriage Act is deeply integrated with numerous legislative frameworks concerning succession, taxation, guardianship, adoption, pensions, and inheritance. Judicially replacing every gender-specific expression with gender-neutral terminology would inevitably require extensive policy decisions extending well beyond statutory interpretation.

Nevertheless, the decision has attracted significant criticism.

A principal criticism concerns the distinction drawn between recognising constitutional rights and providing meaningful remedies. If equality requires equal treatment before the law, continued exclusion from marriage arguably perpetuates substantive inequality despite formal recognition of dignity.

The minority opinion of Chief Justice Chandrachud is particularly significant because it recognises that constitutional protection of intimate relationships should extend beyond decriminalisation. His emphasis upon the constitutional right to establish families reflects an evolving understanding of Article 21 as protecting not merely individual autonomy but relational autonomy.

Another criticism concerns the Court’s treatment of constitutional morality. In earlier landmark decisions—including Navtej Singh Johar and the Sabarimala case—the Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional rights cannot await majoritarian acceptance. By leaving marriage equality entirely to Parliament, critics argue that the Court adopted a comparatively restrained approach inconsistent with its earlier transformative jurisprudence.

However, defenders of the majority observe that unlike decriminalisation under Section 377, marriage equality requires positive legislative architecture involving hundreds of statutory consequences. The institutional competence argument therefore carries greater force in this context than in previous LGBTQIA+ litigation.

From a comparative constitutional perspective, the judgment contrasts with decisions of constitutional courts in jurisdictions such as South Africa, the United States (prior to subsequent developments), Colombia, and Taiwan, where judicial intervention significantly advanced marriage equality. The Indian Supreme Court instead preferred democratic constitutionalism over judicial innovation.

Ultimately, Supriyo Chakraborty represents neither a complete victory nor a complete defeat for LGBTQIA+ rights. It constitutionalises equality, dignity, and protection against discrimination while postponing legal recognition of marriage to the legislative sphere. Consequently, the judgment establishes an important constitutional foundation for future statutory reform, even though it declines to deliver marriage equality through judicial interpretation.

The long-term significance of the decision may therefore lie less in its immediate outcome than in its reaffirmation that queer persons constitute equal constitutional citizens whose claims to family life remain legitimate subjects for legislative action.